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THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM FOR
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
Robert B. Fenneuff, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1997
My research explores John Dewey's political theory in order to determine what
practical and theoretical significance it has for liberal democratic nation-states that face
significant problems in a number of areas. The problems Dewey's political theory is
most concerned with stem from the impact of highly complex modern technology upon
the ability of a democratic society to strive closer towards its ideals of freedom ,
equality, and community. My research shows that Dewey's theory calls for an
experimental re-creation of social and political institutions with the purpose of creating
an effective means by which society can organize the complex technology at its
disposal for the betterment of democracy and community.
I arrive at this conclusion by showing that Dewey's epistemology, ethics, and
his application of-scientific method are fundamentally linked in a naturalistic
philosophy. I then show that Dewey's application of his philosophy to social and
political problems requires an experimental revisioning of political institutions and
processes in order to take advantage of the new methods of inquiry and control at our
disposal, and to bring about a new sense of vitality in our democracy as a whole.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Dewey's pragmatism weds scientifically rigorous methods of inquiry with
ethical deliberation, culminating in an experimental search procedure designed to make
democratic institutions and practices vital. Vitality here means a constant revisioning
process, whereby citizens and elected officials shape political institutions and practices
according to the needs of each particular place and time. It also means developing a
process whereby individual citizens can have the greatest amount of input, that is
practically realizable in public policy decisions. Dewey believed that democratic
institutions and practices had become outdated and ineffective in meeting the needs of
a technologically advanced, highly complex society. It was his hope that we could
breathe new life into our democracy by recreating political institutions with the aid of
the advanced methods of inquiry at our disposal. This thesis will explore Dewey's
understanding of the problems our democracy faces, and the methods he envisions as
the most effective means of dealing with them.
Dewey's work is applicable to a broad range of subjects. For this reason, it is
also appealing to a diverse group of scholarly perspectives. Rorty and other linguistic
pragmatists take from Deweyan pragmatism its conception of use values. Individuals
such as Mark Okrent find strong similarities between Dewey's work and continental
philosophy. 1 Others such as James Campbell have applied Deweyan pragmatism to
1
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community-wide public discourse. 2 Comel West has quite accurately placed Dewey
within a tradition of American intellectuals who have developed a uniquely American
voice. 3 Robert Westbrook's commentary, Alan Ryan's recent biography, and a host of
other publications illustrate and contribute to the recent increased interest in Dewey's
work. 4
There are a number of other groups which may find Dewey's work appealing.
Recent anti-federalist, or state's rights groups might find Dewey's discussion of the
benefits of localized forms of government very sympathetic to their cause. Multi
culturalists might find their work closely allied to Dewey's, because his programmatic
method of deliberation lays foundations for public discourse that emphasizes
inclusivity. Ryan points out that a concern with the benefits and dangers of multi
culturalism, and the concern with community, are similarities between Dewey's era
and our own. 5 Harbingers of a post-behavioral revolution in the study of politics and
public policy, such as David Easton, have extolled the virtues of a synthesis of
normative and quantitative analysis in political science, and public policy decision
making. 6 Dewey's work also touches upon issues in the philosophies of science and
education that are still relevant today. This list is by no means exhaustive. I think I
have only given a bare outline of the myriad of interests that Dewey's work may
appeal to today. Although my research is limited to the application ofDeweyan
pragmatism to socio-political matters, even this must necessarily cross over into other
areas of discussion. One must take account ofDewey's epistemological, metaphysical,
and ethical positions in order to arrive at complete understanding of his political
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theory. He did not think these positions were exclusive of one another. As seen in the
second chapter, he saw these areas of discussion as fundamentally overlapping, and
informing one another. Given this, he saw formal divisions between ethical,
metaphysical, or epistemological matters as purely intellectual artifices.
I begin with a discussion of Dewey's epistemology, in the context of my
critical response to Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer's The Eclipse of Reason focuses
extensively on Dewey as an amoral instrumentalist, who Horkheimer argues is
substantially responsible for the decline of morality in modem society. This discussion
lays the foundation for a comparison of their respective positions on ethics, since both
Horkheimer and Dewey blend the formal categories of epistemology and ethics. This
discussion also serves to introduce Dewey's understanding of scientific method and its
role in his program of social regeneration. This introductory outline of scientific
method in Dewey's program is followed by a more elaborate treatment of the subject
in subsequent chapters.
I chose to respond to Horkheimer's criticism for a number of reasons.
Horkheimer's status as the founder of the Critical Theory school of philosophy,
together with the recent resurgence of interest in his work, make him a relevant figure
with which to contend. 7 Dewey's philosophy has a great deal in common with
Horkheimer's, including the above mentioned blending of ethics and epistemology.
This makes it all the more interesting that Horkheimer was so vehemently opposed to
Dewey. The discussion in Chapter II focuses on a comparison of Dewey's and
Horkheimer's epistemology, how Horkheimer incorrectly concludes that his
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epistemology is completely different from Dewey's, and how Dewey's philosophy is
not void of a sense of ethics. The substantial nature of Dewey's ethics is taken up in
the fourth chapter.
The third chapter focuses on Dewey's view of scientific method as a mode of
inquiry into the possible public choices a community has before it. Dewey's use of
scientific method can be effectively illustrated through a critical response to Richard
Rorty. Rorty has explicitly attempted to excise Dewey's view of scientific method
from what contemporary pragmatism retains of Dewey's philosophy. If Rorty's
reading of Dewey becomes the authoritative one, we will neglect a very substantial
component of Dewey's work. This is especially so since few people actually read
Dewey's work today, despite recent interest in it. As one of the leading pragmatists
today, Rorty has a rather substantial following. 8 Due to this, it may be the case that
readers would take Rorty's perspective on Dewey's work as authoritative. This
possibility demands a critical response.
Chapter IV builds upon the discussions in the previous two chapters by
showing how Dewey understands ethics and scientific method as one. His naturalistic
ethics, as further elaborated in chapter four, easily lends itself to scientifically rigorous
modes of inquiry. Since his ethics, and the standard conception of scientific method
are both empirically grounded, appealing to nothing beyond the world of experience
and observation, they are compatible and complimentary.
Dewey's naturalistic ethics, and his understanding of scientific method, are
thoroughly grounded in the constantly changing world around us. He insists that
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deliberation concerning right action should take account ofthe knowledge available in
a particular problematic situation. Deliberation and choice are informed by tradition,
ofcourse, but they also involve responding to the exigencies ofa given situation in
order to resolve ethical dilemmas. Likewise, with scientific method, it changes and
evolves according to the advances in technology and methods ofinquiry available at a
given time. Advances in methods ofinquiry bring about advances in ethical
deliberation, ifscientific methods are in fact applied to moral choice-making.
Dewey's exposition ofthese ideas is more schematic than it is material. In
other words, his argument is not as highly detailed, or as formally rendered, as some
would like. Dewey advocates a programmatic plan ofaction to make democratic
institutions vital, but he doesn't provide a detailed outline ofhow to accomplish this
goal. However, a critical response to his ideas, iflimited to this assertion, would not
do adequate justice to Dewey's intentions as I see them. Both Dewey and Horkheimer
alike saw the potential menace to society created by technological advances that aren't
held in check by ethical deliberation concerning the right applications ofnew methods
ofproduction, communication, inquiry, etc. Unlike Horkheimer, Dewey saw the
possibility ofethical deliberation, particularly in an era ofnihilism and moral relativism,
based upon new methods ofscientific inquiry. Horkheimer wished to resuscitate dying
ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical doctrines based upon a (theological)
tradition oriented towards extra-worldly origins.
Dewey views the process ofscientific experimentation as the best model for
ethical deliberation. The application ofthis model to social and political institutions is
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the broadly sweeping outcome ofDewey's pragmatism. His philosophy is meant to
have broad applications in educational, political, and other social institutions, as well
as in the lives ofindividuals. Chapter V focuses on the application ofDewey's
philosophy to political institutions with a tradition ofliberal democracy, the key but
not sole example ofwhich is the United States.
Democracy in politics is enhanced by Dewey's methods. Since it is clear that
the ideal vision oftrue democracy will never be realized in practice, communities must
look to ways to bring about as much ofthe democratic element in their political
institutions as possible, ifthey hold the democratic ideal to be one ofthe means to the
highest fraternal and communal ends ofassociated living. Dewey thought this might
be achieved by enhancing local political institutions, while allowing citizens greater
participation in decision-making. This was coupled in his view with an intersubjective
framework for deliberations that has inclusive or centripetal qualities.
As is shown in Chapter V, Dewey asserts that experimentation with political
and social institutions is a necessary component ofa vital democracy. Vital here
means a living, changing, and adapting sort ofdemocratic political process. Retaining
the political institutions and principles ofprior generations, without conforming them
to the needs ofthe present generation, makes democracy unable to maintain vital
connections with its citizenry. Ifthis is the case, it follows that social and political
institutions must evolve through experimental processes, according to Dewey, in order
to achieve the closest approximation to the democratic ideal as possible.
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This notion of experimentation with political institutions and practices is quite
a scary prospect in itself Failure is built into the experimental process, and this is
quite unacceptable to many. However, the conscious acceptance of the possibility of
failure, the acceptance of risk, obviates the further possibility to accept that some
changes may be mistaken, and to accept that a return to a previous state of affairs is
warranted. Such an admission does not ameliorate the potential consequences of
failure; however, it does point out that experimental steps taken incrementally do not
entail the impossibility of return.
All of this may sound overly optimistic. Yet, one can see Dewey's philosophy
as a reaction to his, as well as Horkheimer's, perception that technological advance
without an ongoing critique of its application can lead to disastrous consequences for
society. Scientifically rigorous ethical deliberation is a way of having a method of
control that is equal to the task of controlling the application of technological
advances.
The motivations behind Dewey's work are as varied as the subject-matter he
discusses. However, I speculate that what motivated him to express his ideas in the
form he did stems from his faith in the transformative power of ideas. Dewey's
emphasis on the role played by the early Enlightenment, the scholars of the

Encyc/opedie, illustrates several things. 9 Firstly, it illustrates in his argument the
changing view of human nature throughout history, and effect these changes had upon
socio-political institutions. This discussion serves as the foundation for the assertion
that cultural tendencies cause a shift in conceptions of human nature. These shifting
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conceptions, in tum, have dramatic impacts upon social conditions and institutions.
Secondly, his emphasis on the impact of the Enlightenment illustrates what he sees as
his own role in social discourse. I think Dewey considered his own work as a
continuation of the Enlightenment project. His synthesis of scientific method with
community-wide ethical deliberation is quite similar to the Enlightenment's wedding of
reason with ideas about human freedom. As an intellectual contribution to liberal
democratic discourse, I think Dewey's work is somewhat similar to the approach seen
in the Enlightenment in form and substance. I speculate that the hope or optimism that
motivates Dewey is that his presentation of the problems our democracy faces will
motivate his readers to begin to inquire into the nature and efficacy of our social and
political institutions. This is precisely what I describe as the transformative power of
ideas. I think it is what Dewey saw in the Enlightenment, and what he saw as the
potential of his own work.
Dewey's work is meant to be applicable primarily within a liberal-democratic
community. Due to this, there are implicit fundamental values in his arguments. The
respect and dignity of all persons, free speech and press, and widely understood
conceptions of humanist values are all taken as given bases of his arguments. The
assertion that his program would have drastically different results in a community that
has a tradition of slavery, segregation, or some other form of human rights violations
liberal-democratic communities would find morally repugnant, would simply receive
the response from Dewey that it has overlooked the particular nature of the
community to which his program is directed. Dewey's pragmatism was not conceived
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as having relativistic values as its bases. It is firmly rooted in the western liberal
democratic tradition.

CHAPTER II
HORKHEIMER, ETHICS, AND EPISTEMOLOGY
My initial discussion of Dewey's epistemology and value theory is illustrated
through a response to the criticism directed at him by Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer's
position, stated as succinctly as possible, is that Dewey's pragmatism is an example of
subjectivist, amoral instrumentalism, which is responsible to a great extent for the
decadence of industrial society. Elaboration of this admittedly brief account of
Horkheimer's position will be followed by a discussion of why I think Horkheimer has
mis-read Dewey's work. I will show that since Horkheimer and Dewey share a
common concern with social decay, it does not follow that Dewey misses the core of
the problem. Furthermore, it is not the case that Dewey's efforts at redressing the
social ills of the industrial age only compound the problem of social decay, as
Horkheimer suggests. Rather, Horkheimer's perspective on Dewey's work is due to
the different angle from which Horkheimer approaches the problem of social
decadence in the industrial age. The different approaches Horkheimer and Dewey take
toward the problem of social decay are illustrated below.
This chapter also functions to introduce Dewey's understanding of scientific
method and its role in his program of social regeneration. The introduction of this
aspect of Dewey's program is followed by a more lengthy treatment of the role of
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scientific method in developing innovative political institutions and practices in chapter
five.
Horkheimer asserts that the subject/object dichotomy of modern epistemology,
which forms "the present crisis in reason," is manifest in what he describes as the
polarization of objective and subjective reason. 1 He describes the hegemony of
"objective reason" in ancient and medieval thought as characterized by the "conviction
that an all embracing or fundamental structure of being could be discovered and a
conception of human destination derived from it."2 This period, he argues, was not
characterized by a polarized distinction between the objective order and man's
subjective faculties. "Subjective reason" was manifest as a "partial, limited expression
of a universal rationality" which was used to "reconcile the objective order... with
human existence. "3
According to Horkheimer, the decline of objective reason and the subsequent
rise of subjective reason has taken place incrementally, through the collapse of the
medieval worldview, and up through the critical stage reached in the industrial age.
While some would see elements of modernity as efforts to compensate for the collapse
of the ancient and medieval worldview, Horkheimer sees modernity as a prime
contributor to cultural and spiritual decadence. He views modernity as marked by
man's incapacity to account for his activities beyond purely instrumental justifications.
This is, for Horkheimer, the fundamental cause of the lack of meaning in life, and a
lack of a sense of ethics in our communities. Subjective, or instrumental reason has
emerged as the dominant intellectual force at the expense of an objective moral order.
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The incremental rise in the power ofsubjective reason, as described below, is seen by
Horkheimer to be the cause ofthe loss ofthe objective moral order.
Horkheimer asserts that "subjective reason has come to be commonly regarded
as an intellectual faculty ofcoordination, the efficiency ofwhich can be increased by
the removal ofnon-intellectual factors. ,,4 The incremental increase in subjective
reason as the dominant intellectual force corresponded to the removal ofnon
intellectual, or spiritual guides to man's conduct. Intellectual activity was seen as the
only phenomena that could be controlled, and given a sense ofstability. The

precarious and ever-changing world ofexperience was seen as too unstable, as a world
ofmere appearance. Accordingly, the coordinating activity ofthe mind became the
only thing that was considered real, or as the sole indubitable data. The objective
order continued to lose status due to the rise ofthe structuring ofreality through
man's subjective faculties. This has led to the point where "ifwe say than an
institution or any other reality is reasonable, we usually mean that men have tried to
organize it reasonably. "5
The link between the reasonable and the known, and the unreasonable and the
unknown, forms the basis ofthe polarization seen in modern epistemological dualism.
Surprisingly, this polarization is seen as the basis ofthe crisis ofmorality in Dewey's
and Horkheimer's theories alike. Descartes' method ofdoubt, and the doctrine ofthe
categories in Kantian epistemology, are both revolutionary intellectual moments in the
historical process ofthe decline ofan objective world order and the subsequent rise of
an instrumentalist, subjective world order in Horkheimer's view. The Cartesian
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skeptical position asserted that what can be known for certain is that the res cogitans
exists at the moment it is engaged in thought. Also, the res cogitans doubts that
anything outside of itself exists. In Kantian epistemology, the world is constructed
mentally according to the way that we categorize it. The fundamental Ding an sich, or
sub-strata, is entirely outside of our grasp. Hence, in the Kantian framework, it is
altogether unknowable whether an objective order exists. Horkheimer argues that
these conclusions of modern philosophy have led to a point where ''thinking either
became incapable of conceiving objectivity at all or began to negate it as a delusion.,,6
This predicament has led to "epistemologically unsolvable problems...(where)each of
the poles of reason has been torn away from the other by abstraction."7 Horkheimer's
conclusion here is remarkably similar to Dewey's characterization of the present crisis
caused by these epistemological dead ends. What makes this conjunction so surprising
is not simply the similarity of their conclusions; rather it is the fact that Horkheimer
vehemently criticizes Dewey specifically for being a cause of the crisis of the industrial
age due to Dewey's purportedly amoral, instrumentalist view of science and its social
functions. Dewey, as is shown below, rejects epistemological dualism for reasons that
are similar to those asserted by Horkheimer. Dewey criticizes epistemological dualism
as a dead end. Like Horkheimer, he criticizes it for producing an amoral subjectivism.
Notice here the transition from an epistemological to an ethical problem. Dewey
states that "the chief obstacle to a more effective criticism of current values lies in the
traditional separation of nature and experience."8 Horkheimer uses the terms nature
and objective order interchangeably.9 The similarity of terminology is by no means the
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strength of the argument here. The substantive content of Dewey's and Horkheimer's
positions are what is so strikingly similar.
Westbrook points out Dewey's criticism of epistemological dualism in his
discussion of Dewey's account of experience. Dewey's "concept of experience is
neither dualistic nor subjective," which as I will show below, places Dewey's theory
outside the grasp of Horkheimer's criticism. 10 Dewey's organic epistemology asserts
that man's experience is fundamentally linked to the natural world, therefore it is not
dualistic. The interaction between man and nature gives rise to man's understanding
of the world, hence Dewey's philosophy is not purely subjective. "A key mistake of
the epistemological industry, Dewey argued, was its treatment of experience (where)
knowing subjects were set apart from an objective world that they attempted to
know."11 Dewey viewed this "epistemological industry" as a flawed vocation leading
to unsolvable puzzles much in the same way that Horkheimer saw it. Like
Horkheimer, Dewey sought to reintegrate subjective reason, or man's perception of
experience, into nature in order to arrive at a systematic understanding of the world
and the place of humanity in it. Dewey sought to reconcile experience and nature by
showing how adaptation and reasoned inquiry integrate man into his environment.
''Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience that is experienced, but
nature".12 Westbrook further clarifies this point, stating that:
Dewey believed that the persuasive evidence for his postulate of immediate
empiricism was provided by evolutionary biology, which had established that
experience was a process of interaction between a living being and its
environment. 13
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These assertions clearly show the basic thrust of Dewey's organic philosophy.
According to this, man is a natural being whose ability to reason is an adaptive
mechanism that developed in response to man's struggle to perpetuate his species.
Man's intellectual activity could not evolve as it did if it had been set apart from the
world of sensory experience. Given this, man's intellectual activity is a biological
phenomenon that exists as part of natural processes.
Dewey wished to prove the futility of the epistemological industry and its
attempt to account for man's intellectual activity. Further, he proposed to show how
his empirical method would lead beyond the puzzles created by epistemological
dualism. Thirdly and most importantly, Dewey asserted that his empirical method was,
as Horkheimer plainly did not see, a method by which fundamental ethical
deliberations could be made that would not end in the static conception of human
agency found in traditional metaphysics, or in irreconcilable differences created by
competing moral relativist positions. This third goal, that of overcoming irreconcilable
differences in relativistic moral positions, is one shared by Horkheimer and Dewey.
They both had a faith that the natural order is such that human reintegration into it
would allow for the solution of humanity's problems in the modem age. Relativism,
and epistemological dualism, are seen by both Dewey and Horkheimer as the barriers
to such reintegration.
Epistemological dualism ''failed to recognize the mediating function of
knowledge within a circuit of non-cognitive experience." 14 This circuit is accounted
for in Dewey's scientific method of inquiry. Dewey's "denotative", or empirical

16

method is one in which verification of experience is always "secured by a return to the
things of crude or macroscopic experience. " 15 Modern philosophical notions of the
verification of things beyond doubt through intellectual processes was a method that
ironically went against its own logic. Modern philosophy's methods first isolate
characteristics of things known, then proclaim that these isolated characteristics are
the only real things, all the while basing the activity involved in isolating these
characteristics upon disavowed reference to some real object in the world. The denial
of this real object in the world, while reifying the characteristics that find their origin in
this object, is an altogether dubious activity. Dewey asserts that "the subject matter of
primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of reflection which
constructs the secondary (intellectual) objects. " 16 His empirical method of verification
requires the reality of the objects of primary experience. Greater understanding of the
objects of experience results from the recurrence to the world at large. This is how
the verification of the intellectual constructs of objects (those of secondary experience
in Dewey's vernacular), takes place. When this is done:
the (primary) qualities cease to be isolated details; they get the meaning
contained in a whole system of related objects; they are rendered continuous
with the rest of nature and take on the import of things they are now seen to be
continuous with. 17
This is a summary of Dewey's empirical or denotative method. The experience
of primary objects, and the construction of secondary objects, are both reintegrated
into the environment. Modern philosophy finds stumbling blocks, or epistemological
dead-ends where a chair I experience is not at all the same as that of another's
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experience, although the reference point of experience is the same object. The dead
end is found in modern philosophy's inability to transcend the supposed problem of
"knowing" the chair. The move beyond this dead-end involves a re-orientation
towards questioning what the chair is good for, or whether it is useful for purposes
intended. Epistemological dualism does not allow for questions concerning what our
understanding of the world does for us, or whether our understanding of the world and
our place in it can help us solve problems attributable to our agency. The
"epistemological industry" does not allow for questions concerning whether a
particular activity was a good choice, rather it asks repeatedly and ad infinitum
whether we can be sure that our activities effect an objective world. "The problems to
which empirical method gives rise affords opportunities for more investigations
yielding more fruit in new and enriched experiences. " 18 It is the only method, so
Dewey argues, for re-integrating human agency into the world. Empirical method
gives greater understanding of objects experienced in the world than epistemological
dualism. It also allows us to have a better understanding of our place in the world.
Dewey acknowledges that "appeal to experience by a philosopher is treated by
many as necessarily committing one to subjectivism." 19 He further states that this
assumption has become "so deeply engrained" as it has because of developments in
epistemology stemming from the modern era. 20 However, Dewey clearly shows how
his theory is altogether different than the subjectivism that some, including
Horkheimer, would proclaim it to be.
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The psychology of personality, which is seen by Dewey as an outgrowth of
subjectivism, has become quite malicious for philosophy.21 In a not so veiled criticism
of the Cartesian res cogitans, Dewey asserts that "mental attitudes...were treated as
self sufficient and complete in themselves...the sole original and therefore indubitable
data."22 Correspondingly, those things experienced in the world were considered
phenomenal, mere appearances. Dewey's theory runs completely counter to
subjectivist philosophy. His process of verification of secondary experience, discussed
above, through a recurrence to primary experience places a great emphasis upon the
reality of objects sensually experienced. It is fundamental to his method that the world
is as it is experienced. Our assurance of this assertion's validity is that the activities
we undertake as a result of our perception of the world lead to consequences intended.
As stated above, there are great similarities between Horkheimer's and
Dewey's theories concerning epistemology. Both very clearly assert that the
subject/object distinction is a dangerous abstraction. Logic, according to Horkheimer,
"is ...of the object as well as the subject; it is a comprehensive theory of the basic
categories and relations of society, nature, and history."23 Dewey calls for us to "see
that knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside the
natural and social scene."24 Notice here again that there is a blending of the formal
categories of epistemology and ethics in the theories of both authors. They both assert
that subject and object are inseparable. Horkheimer states that ''the two fundamental
categories of spirit and nature are inextricably linked."25 Dewey's empirical method
links the secondary objects of intellectual activity to the primary objects of
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experience. 26 Dewey's organicism fuses human intellect and human agency with the
world of ordinary sensory experience. As seen above, Dewey's method involves a
circuit of experience. This circuit involves a recurrence to, and critique of, primary
objects by secondary objects and vice versa. This mutual critique is very similar to
what Horkheimer advocates between objective and subjective reason. Further, this
mutual critique in both Dewey's and Horkheimer's theories forms a fundamental
component of their theories of ethics.
One way of falsely linking objective and subjective reason was characterized by
Horkheimer as a form of monism where spirit was still seen to be dominant. His view
of this form of monisn is that "it represents an attempt to consolidate the claim of spirit
to total domination...for nothing is to remain outside the all embracing concept."27 If
this is the argument against monism, it is clearly not relevant to Dewey's theory.
Westbrook's assertion that Dewey's evidence for his "postulate of immediate
empiricism" provided by evolutionary biology, runs counter to Horkheimer's charge
against monism. 28 Dewey's evidence showed that evolution is a "process of
interaction between a living being and its environment."29 The organism must adapt to
its environment or perish. Organisms make changes in their immediate environments,
however, these changes are subtle in comparison to the adaptations the organism must
make in response to environmental demands. While this example fails to account for
the extreme changes to the environment created by the human race, it does express the
point that adaptation is an interactive process where neither environmental conditions,
nor the organism, is passive. If this example is persuasive, it lends strength to the
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argument that Horkheimer's criticism of monistic philosophies is not relevant to a
discussion of Dewey's theory. "Spirit is the complement of nature" Horkheimer
argues, and we "must not pose one or the other as the ultimate."30 Dewey's
philosophy does not do so. He views human agency as wholly within and part of
nature. Further, Dewey argues against the "belief that nature is an indifferent, dead
mechanism."31
Horkheimer does not see the link between Dewey's epistemology and his
ethics. He clearly sees the link between Deweyan epistemology and human agency,
but he somehow fails to see how Dewey's ethics are a product of his empirical
method. Horkheimer asserts that "the subjectivism of (pragmatism) lies in the role our
practices, actions, and interests play in its theory of knowledge, not in its acceptance
of a phenomenalistic doctrine. "32 Horkheimer does take note of the deliberative
function in Deweyan pragmatism, but since he sees no value theory in it, he cannot
account for the role deliberation as to right action plays in Dewey's theory.
Horkheimer's polemic against pragmatism reaches an apex in the following passage:
Pragmatism...is the counterpart of modem industrialism for which the factory
is the prototype of human existence,, and which models all branches of culture
on the conveyor belt. In order to prove its right to be conceived, each thought
must have an alibi, must present a record of its expediency. 33
Pragmatic deliberation, according to Horkheimer, is based purely on practical
considerations. There are no ethical considerations made, and if they are, they are
outweighed by practical needs. What is seen here is the altogether dubious assertion
that pragmatism does allow for deliberation as to right action, yet it stops short of
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being a theory of ethics. Horkheimer colors the pragmatist as an individual who
makes decisions without regard to anything but practical needs. If the pragmatist,
Horkheimer continues, opposes "the practical consequences of scientific, artistic, or
religious undertakings...his philosophy destroys any other principle to which he could
appeal. "34 What the pragmatist is left with, by this characterization, is more than an
unwillingness to make conscious ethical judgments, he is left with the complete
incapacity to render decisions based upon any sort of principles save for those of
practical necessity. The terrible sense of danger Horkheimer feels is that the
pragmatist thinks anything goes in the name of efficiency and practicality, so that
efficiency will come at the expense of a desensitization to man's capacity to inflict
atrocities upon others on a massive scale. Horkheimer thinks truth as practical success
has superseded controls on human desires that objective reason has previously
afforded humanity. Truth as that which is satisfying, according to this argument,
leaves us with a faculty of judgment based upon emotivism. "In the face of the idea
that truth might afford the opposite of satisfaction and turn out to be shocking to
humanity...the fathers of pragmatism made the satisfaction of the subject the criterion
of truth."35
Is this in fact what Dewey wishes to accomplish? Does Dewey reduce the
desirable to the desires of the subject? Horkheimer thinks that Dewey "identifies the
fulfillment of the desires of people with the highest aspirations of mankind."36 Turning
now from a discussion of Dewey's and Horkheimer's epistemological theories, and
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towards their theories of ethics, I will show that Horkheimer has a distorted
perspective on Deweyan pragmatism.
One of the most common misunderstandings ofDeweyan pragmatism is that it
reduces the desirable to the desired. Ryan gives a laundry list recitation of many of the
writers who have criticized Dewey for precisely this reason. 37 Horkheimer quotes
Dewey completely out of context in this fashion: "Faith in the power of intelligence to
imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent
the instrumentalities of its realization, is our salvation. "38 Horkheimer takes this quote
from Dewey as having two possible meanings. It could refer to ''the desires of the
people as they really are," although this is ruled out because people, according to
Horkheimer, are so engulfed in subjectivism that they can't know what their desires
really are. 39 It could mean that "Dewey somehow agrees to accepting some kind of
difference between subjective desire and objective desirability," but this is ruled out in
the name ofHorkheimer's all embracing polemic.
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Horkheimer's view of pragmatism

as a purely instrumental subjectivism would not allow him to accept that Dewey's
theory does more than reduce values to spontaneous, emotive, or instrumental wants
or aims.
Dewey explicitly makes the distinction between the desirability of activity
based upon ethical considerations, and activity based upon simple human desires and
passions. The elaboration of these distinctions, and the method Dewey constructs for
making them, are fundamental components of his theory of ethics.
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Intelligent

inquiry, as outlined in The Quest for Certainty, and elsewhere, is proposed by Dewey
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for the sake of making clear, highly circumspect choices among actions and objects.
Dewey's method shows that science and morality, instrumentalism and ethical
deliberation, are not at odds. Rather, scientific method can help articulate the reasons
behind a particular choice of action, and lead to a more fruitful understanding of one's
community.
"Known objects exist as the consequences of directed operations," according
to Dewey. 42 What he considers intelligent action is a set of "operations actually
performed in the modification of conditions. "43 Intelligent method is the use of
scientific method in inquiry concerning right action. Dewey believes that full
circumspection of the reciprocal relationship between us and the environment,
including the consequences of our input into the relationship, can only proceed
successfully with the use of a rigorous methodology that employs scientific principles.
"Intelligence within nature," Dewey argues, "means liberation and expansion,
as reason outside nature means fixation and restriction."44 The freedom found in what
Dewey describes as intelligent action, versus perceiving fixed antecedent principles,
places great emphasis on the ability of individuals to make a mark, or have an impact
upon their existence. If man lived solely by fixed principles, there would be little room
for creativity, or it would be a bounded creativity of such a limited type that our
choices would be of little importance. These statements may be hyperbole, but they
stress what is so important to Dewey in his advocacy of the use of intelligent action to
solve problems. The problems I refer to are not simply instrumental, i.e., based on
achieving greater efficiency. They are instead instrumental in its normative sense,
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involving how we live together as a community, how we can make living in an
industrial society more satisfying, and how we can have a positive impact on our
environment. Man's capacity to have a great impact upon his environment, natural
and social, places great responsibility on all of us to use whatever effective means
available to understand the consequences of our actions.
With these points in mind, it becomes altogether clear that Deweyan
pragmatism is not at all inconsistent with ethical deliberation. This can be seen in
Dewey's discussion of the difference between the desired and the desirable. This
discussion also shows that Horkheimer's out of context quotation of Dewey above is
an example of how completely Horkheimer misunderstands pragmatism. Dewey
argues that:
To call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain conditions.
Function and status in meeting conditions is a different matter from bare
existence. The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its
desirability; it does not settle it. 45
This quotation simply does not square with Horkheimer's interpretation. Dewey
asserts that one must use intelligent method to determine desirability. One must place
the potential fulfillment of the desire within the context of all the implications said
fulfillment would have for the relationships one has to the environment and to the
community. This is the only way a simple desire can rise to the status of a value in
Deweyan ethics. "To say that something satisfies is to report something as an isolated
finality. To assert that it is satisfactory is to define it in its connections and
interactions. "46 This is clearly an example of the acceptance of the responsibility for
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one's own actions, and the use of ethical judgments to guide these actions in the
direction that takes account of their consequences for ourselves and for others.
One might say in response to this that accounting for the effects that desires
have on our relationships amounts to having antecedent normative principles. Dewey
would certainly not deny this. He would never claim that there are no antecedent
normative principles, as his goal of developing more vital democratic processes in
political institutions indicates. The key is that conforming principles to the needs of
given situation is what Dewey emphasizes. Much like satisfactions that are not
reflected upon, claiming antecedent principles without conforming them to immediate
needs is liken to reporting them as an isolated finality. However, this does not mean
there are no antecedent principles.
The formation of a cultivated and effectively operative good judgment or taste
with respect to what is esthetically admirable, intellectually acceptable, and
morally approvable is the supreme task set to human beings by the incidents of
·
expenence. 47
One must necessarily overlook these passages in order to argue consistently that
Deweyan pragmatism is an amoral, purely instrumental philosophy. Given this, it is
reasonable to assert that Horkheimer is guilty of the fallacy of selective emphasis in
his criticism of Deweyan pragmatism.
Deweyan pragmatism has been criticized for having nothing to say about
ultimate goods. Faced with connecting Dewey's ethical theory to social democratic
institutions, Ryan explains that "other people had been thinking of the institutional
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details, and (Dewey) had little to add... people would design and build social
democratic institutions as they went, and he could not pre-empt them. "48
What Dewey sought to provide, as his critics did not understand, is a way to
articulate our choices of the things we place value in. His critics wanted a concrete,
highly specific account of virtue. They believe Dewey's work came up empty in this
regard. Dewey wished to show how art, science, and the religious sentiment can all be
used as tools to inquire into our role in nature and our community. Artistic creation
functions to express our natural and social bonds. It is a way in which we shape our
world and our expression of ourselves.
. Since art is the most universal form of language, since it is constituted, even
apart from literature, by the common qualities of the public world, it is the
most universal and freest form of communication. Every intense experience of
friendship and affection communicates itself artistically...that art weds man
and nature is a familiar fact. Art also renders men aware of their union with
one another in origin and destiny.49
We can formulate an understanding, through artistic expression, of those things
we value in the world. Art is an activity through which the meaning of our existence is
announced. Artistic creation is put to the same task as scientific inquiry. Ryan points
out that Dewey's claims concerning art "are part of his insistence that pragmatism has
its own account of the ultimate goods of human life - those experiences that we value
for their own sake, as conferring meaning on the rest. "50
The creative method employed in art, science and the world of everyday
experience, is analogous to the function of democratic procedures in social affairs. We
use similar methods of inquiry in artistic expression, scientific inquiry, and in the
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discourse on the nature of community. Ryan states that "Dewey thought of
democratic processes as a search procedure in which we look for policies, laws, and
administrative techniques that will allow us to continue a common life in a way that all
of us can find fruitful and fulfilling. "51
It is quite clear that from the above exposition of Deweyan pragmatism that it
is not at all inconsistent with moral deliberation. It is in fact an enunciation of a way in
which an understanding of our place in the world, our relationship with the natural and
social world, can be taken into account in deliberation as to right action. Its focus is
on the consequences of actions for ourselves and for others, rather than on antecedent
measures of value which Dewey finds to be backward looking and anachronistic. 52
Ryan's poignant quote in this context is an adequate summation of Dewey's
intentions:
To gain an integrated individuality, each of us needs to cultivate his own
garden. But there is no fence about this garden: it is no sharply marked off
enclosure. Our garden is the world, in the angle at which it touches our
own manner of being. By accepting the corporate and industrial world in
which we live, and by thus fulfilling the precondition of our interaction with it,
we, who are also parts of the moving present, create ourselves as we
create an unknown future. 53

CHAPTER III
RORTY, METHOD, AND METAPHOR
I turn my attention now to Richard Rorty's work, with respect to his
comments and criticisms concerning Dewey's emphasis on scientific method and its
potential impact upon social organization, social progress, and the alleviation of social
ills through experimentation and innovation. What is of such great interest here is that
Rorty not only speaks from the rhetorically powerful position of one who is
sympathetic to Dewey's work; he fully considers himself a Deweyan pragmatist
engaged in the task of retaining what is important in Dewey's work for contemporary
culture. I am of a charitable mindset with respect to Rorty's attempt to retain the
spirit of Dewey while purging that spirit of the faults within the letter of Dewey's
work. I am also in complete agreement with Richard Bernstein that pragmatism is a
rather diverse school of thought, and that there can be seen a sub-current of ideas that
runs throughout the works of the major figures lumped together under the rubric
"pragmatism", including Rorty. However, there are grounds within the Deweyan
canon from which one can mount a strong argument that Rorty has taken a very
narrow aspect of Dewey's work and held this to be indicative of its spirit. One can
assert that Rorty has appropriated Dewey's "spirit", and reformed it to fit Rorty's own
project, which involves a re-orientation of philosophy away from metaphysics and
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epistemology and towards linguistic theory and cultural criticism, manifest in his
linguistic pragmatism.
Rorty sees linguistic pragmatism's task as "one of reconciliation of the old with
the new, and (philosophy's) professional function as serving as honest brokers
between generations, between areas of cultural activity, and between traditions." 1
Linguistic pragmatism, according to Rorty, works to "change familiar ways of
speaking so as not to presuppose a metaphysics, or a metaphysical psychology. "2 The
purpose in Rorty's project is to develop ways that "old beliefs and new beliefs... can
cooperate rather than interfere with one another. "3 This project serves to free
language and culture from the dominance of the belief systems of the past, so that old
metaphysical presuppositions do not have the capability of oppressing human
creativity, which would "conflict with the needs of the future."4 By doing away with
descriptions of things that do not adequately express the historical moment, freedom
from the constraints of tradition is gained, and the moment of self-creation, self
identification, is achieved. Descriptions of things in language, dance, or other artistic
media, express a culture's and an individual's sense of relevance. Linguistic
pragmatism mediates between the new developments in one's culture, and what is
deemed relevant in one's received tradition.
A defense of Dewey against Rorty's appropriation of some aspects of his work
will serve a twofold purpose. Firstly, it is hoped that this will allow at least a broader
perspective to be taken of Dewey's work, broader than that seen through the
perspective of a linguistic pragmatist. Secondly, this exposition is meant to bring to
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light the social and political implications of Deweyan pragmatism for contemporary
liberal democracies by laying bare the foundations for a more elaborate treatment of
this subject matter in subsequent chapters.
Dewey's emphasis on scientific method is absolutely essential to his version of
pragmatism. It must be made clear that Dewey's understanding of scientific method is
not as a process that discloses some essential universal Truths about the world. It is
an approach which removes personal prejudice from inquiry, and allows for the
intersubjective, repeatable, rigorous, and systematic use of inquiry to explore
possibilities and their consequences. 5 What Dewey appears to mean by scientific
method, although Rorty does not suggest that he sees this, is the standard
understanding of science as a method of generalization, classification, explanation, and
hopefully prediction. This is why Dewey doesn't provide, as Rorty wishes he did, a
straightforward explanation of what he means by scientific method. 6 Dewey does
make clear that what he means by scientific method is essentially the standard version I
have mentioned above. He states that:
in experiment everything takes place above board, in the open. Everything is
overt and capable of being observed. There is a specified antecedent state of
things; a specified operation using means, both physical and symbolic, which
are externally exhibited and reported. The entire process by which the
conclusion is reached...is overt. It can be repeated step by step by anyone.
Thus everyone can judge for himself whether or not the conclusion
reached ...justifies assertion of knowledge.7
This passage lends strong support to the argument that Dewey meant nothing
particularly vague or exotic by "scientific method." Furthermore, Dewey held that the
idea of scientific method as a revealer of universal truths, and of science as truth itself,
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is the "now discarded philosophy ofscience."8 Illustrating this point more completely,
Dewey states that it is a "misapprehension" ofscience as a concept to think ofit as do
"those who have professed adoration ofscience - writing it with a capital S--; those
who have thought ofit not as a method ofapproach but as ...a new theology ofself
sufficient authoritatively revealed inherent and absolute Truth. "9
Rorty vacillates between asserting that Dewey had no clear conception ofwhat
he meant by method, and asserting that Dewey meant by method that contains the old
epistemological baggage Rorty, and Dewey alike were trying to do away with. One
can see this quite clearly in Rorty's response to an article by James Guinlock. 10 At one
point, Rorty exclaims that the notion ofmethod is vacuous; at another, he states that
"Ifwe (get rid ofthe term method) we shall be saying what no non-Platonist disputes:
that in a tragic world we muddle along as best we can." 11 Rorty's preference is to
"drop the term, and call (it) social practices (in the cultural realm) and technique (in
the scientific realm)." 12 His distinction between method and techniques or practices
borders on pedantic quibbling, as he loses the spirit ofDewey and opts for an incorrect
understanding ofDewey's use ofthe term "method" in order to attack it as a straw
man. The claim that use ofthe term ''technique" is superior to the use ofthe term
"method" amounts to the implication that there is a specific, epistemologically
weighted meaning to the term "method," whereas this isn't the case for the term
''technique." Either Rorty is claiming that Dewey is using the term "method" with
classic epistemological implications, or he is disclosing his (Rorty's) epistemological
commitments. This method ofinterpretation is evidence ofhow Rorty views other
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writer's use of such terms in general. He loads them with epistemological baggage in
order to construct a weaker, non-charitable version of the writer's position. Such
rhetorical tactics are disingenuous to the task Rorty claims to have set for himself, that
of the rescucitator of the spirit of Dewey. 13 Furthermore, there seems to be a sense of
urgency in Rorty's fixation on ridding language of words that imply an inherent grasp
of"Truths" such those he infers in Dewey's use of"method." My point here is that if
these terms do not has this effective power in the world of experience, disclosing
truths of whatever sort, then there is no need to place the level of effort in countering
them that Rorty expends. On the other hand, if terms such as "method" do exhibit
some sort of effective force in the world, or hold some practical value for us, then they
exhibit the sort of use value Rorty is looking for in language. If either is the case,
Rorty might wish to approach Dewey's perspective on method from a new direction.
It might be the case that Dewey's use of terms such as method creates problems for
Rorty's linguistic theory, as these terms may inhabit some sort of gray area Rorty's
theory doesn't cover quite properly. The urgency I mention above may stem from
such being the case. However, this would only suggest the need to confront the
position these gray area term should take up in one's theory, rather than doing away
with them altogether. Such an imperative should be seen as categorical in one's
treatment of another's theories.
Rorty challenges his readers to cite, "chapter and verse," those passages which
clarify Dewey's position regarding scientific method. 14 He points out that the chapter
entitled "The Supremacy of Method" in The Quest for Certainty does not clarify what
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"method" is. 15 What Rorty finds there is "(Dewey's) endlessly repeated polemic
against epistemological and metaphysical dualisms." 16 However, this is not the place
where one should look to find "chapter and verse" citations of Dewey's conception of
scientific method. One can find the letter and spirit of Dewey's use of this terminology
scattered throughout many of his works. Yet there are particular sections of his
writings which express as clearly as one would expect what he meant by scientific
method.
The section on Penology and Criminology in Individualism Old and New is a
perfect example of Dewey's application of scientific method to the analysis of social
problems. 17 He briefly discusses the (then) current way of treating criminals as evil,
and the progress inherent in dealing with criminal behavior and rehabilitation through
the use of the tools of social science. This can allow penologists to understand
criminal behavior better by seeing it as a "manifestation of interactions between an
individual and the social environment." 18 Dewey clearly opposes scientific methods of
inquiry to pre-scientific methods of addressing social problems rooted in metaphysical
superstitions. This can be seen in his reference to traditional understandings of the
nature of criminality as that of a possessed, evil person. Dewey's methodical
treatment of the problem of criminality consists of observation of the environment in
which the criminal is reared in order to gain an account of the circumstances that give
rise to such behavior. These observations, compounded through repeated, systematic
inquiries of many different backgrounds of criminals over time will yield a body of
empirical accounts of the development of criminal behavior from which generalizations
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can be made. Such of method of inquiry will result in the capacity to make informed
explanations of criminal behavior which can lead to ideas about how to address the
problem.
Dewey's praise of the practical effects of Jeremy Bentham's theoretical works
upon collectivist legislation in the late I 860's is ample evidence of Dewey's intentions
concerning scientific method and its practical applications in liberal democracies.
Dewey notes that "(Bentham) said of himself that his ambition was to extend the
experimental method of reasoning from the physical branch to the moral. " 19 Another
very Deweyan point of praise follows, where he states that "(Bentham's) enduring idea
is that customs, institutions, laws, and social arrangements are to be judged on the
basis of their consequences as these come home to the individuals that compose
society."20 Dewey points out that Bentham's attack upon Lockean natural rights
theory, following Hume, gave theoretical grounds for the support of positive state
action on the above mentioned Bentharnite grounds, whenever such action was seen to
benefit society. 21 This activity in tum led to social legislation in the fields of public
health, education, and "reform bills that greatly broadened the basis of suffiage. "22
What Dewey finds so praiseworthy here is Bentham's extension of Enlightenment
reason to practical application in human affairs. This further strengthens my assertion
that Dewey is engaged in a continuation of the Enlightenment project himself, since
those things he finds so praiseworthy in Bentham's work are precisely those things he
aspires towards in his own. The force of Dewey's attitude toward scientific method is
evident in his discussion of Bentham as well. The power of the advances made in
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scientific inquiry can be shown to have a dramatic influence on our ability to discern
the consequences ofsocial policy in massive and cognitively challenging social
organizations, such as those blossoming in the early industrial age, and those which
have only grown more complex and less amenable to management.
Dewey's emphasis on Bentham here illustrates that he (Dewey) did not
conceive ofscientific method as disclosing universal truths. Dewey asserts that:
The use ofscientific method, even ifsporadic and feeble, encouraged study of
actual consequences and promoted the formation oflegislative policies
designed to improve the consequences brought about by existing institutions.
At all events, in connection with Benthamite influence, it greatly
weakened the notion that reason is a remote majestic power that discloses
ultimate truths. It tended to render it an agency in investigation
ofconcrete situations and in projection ofmeasures for their betterment.23
This passage is evidence that Dewey did not think ofscience as yielding universal
truths. Given this, it does not appear that there is any remarkable distinction between
Dewey's use ofthe term method and Rorty's replacement ofit with the terms
''technique," and "social practice."24 It is unclear what the exchange ofthe term
method for Rorty's terminology will do for us.
Dewey speaks at length ofscientific revolutions, ofadvances in world views
brought about through scientific discoveries, or paradigm shifts in science. His
discussion of Heisenberg's principle ofindeterminacy as a major transformation ofthe
philosophy ofscience, and his discussion ofKant's incorrect application ofwhat Kant
described as the "Copernican Revolution," illustrates Dewey's intimate knowledge of
the history ofscience.25 Dewey's understanding ofscientific method is evident in his
treatment ofthe Copernican system, which asserts that "an idea in experiment is
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tentative, conditional, not fixed and rigorously determinative...the directive idea does
not fix the nature ofthe object. "26 This argument is given as opposed to the Ptolemaic
system, which Dewey states is more similar to Kant's interpretation ofthe
"Copernican Revolution." The Kantian/Ptolemaic system states that the directive idea,
or rather, "the constitution ofthe human subject in knowing" controls antecedently the
outcome ofall inquiry.27 One can see here the opposition between Dewey's
understanding ofscientific method, which is not a method ofimposing fixed principles
upon the world, and the Ptolemaic system which works from such fixed principles, and
is the understanding ofmethod Rorty has incorrectly attributed to Dewey. What is
clear here is that Dewey's view ofscience is consistent with that "cardinal principle" of
empirical knowledge Richard Bernstein claims that all pragmatists would endorse.28
This is seen, according to Bernstein, in Sellar's famous claim that ''Empirical
knowledge, like its sophisticated extension science, is rational, not because it has a
foundation, but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in
jeopardy, though not all at once."29 IfBernstein's statement is an accurate
representation ofa principle that all pragmatists would endorse, it appears odd that
Rorty would attempt to impose upon Dewey a view ofscience that places Dewey
outside the pragmatist fold.
Rorty takes issue with Dewey's attempt to develop a "radical empiricism" with
good cause.30 Rorty rightly points out the flaws in Dewey's argument concerning a
''true" experience, and its inconsistency with the majority ofDewey's arguments
concerning what he considered the pragmatic sense oftruth.31 However, Dewey's
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view ofscientific method need not be conjoined to his inconsistent attempt to describe
what a ''true" experience consists of If one sees rightly Dewey's view ofscientific
method as one that is more consistently allied to Rorty's agreeably preferred
conception ofexperience that "goes back to ta phainomena rather than to empeiria,"
the conception ofthis stronger interpretation concerning the consistency ofDewey's
scientific method with my arguments will appear more clear. 32 Considering that
Dewey thought his expressed view ofexperience was "still more or less inchoate," it
might be the case that one could charitably assume this was experimental discourse on
his part, something he was considering but possibly not even convinced of himself. 33 If
one were to see Dewey's version ofscientific method as linked to a version oftruth
that does not claim to represent anything beyond the assertion that it, as a method of
inquiry, has allowed us to find ways ofcoping with the world by making our activities
more effective in achieving our aims, we can see that scientific inquiry can be a fruitful
tool for engaging in an effective social policy discourse, without trying to work out a
construction ofreality that is an erection ofthe old idols.
Rorty's linguistic turn is a move beyond epistemological concerns with the
nature ofreality. It is a move beyond "experience" and "representation" ofthe real
toward an "appearance" and a "registering" ofaspects ofthe world in language. 34
This is meant to be a superior way oftalking about the world, and ofengaging in
social practices. Now ifwe see Dewey's scientific method in the manner I have been
describing, it becomes clear that it can be a very beneficial component ofengaging the
world and our community, effectively contributing to the project ofwhich Rorty's
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linguistic pragmatism is only a part. The questions then become: What is gained
through maintaining Dewey's view of methodical inquiry in what we retain of the
Deweyan canon, and in our social practices and discourses? What is lost to us by
removing method from what we retain of Dewey, and how will Rorty's version of
pragmatism and his reference to the Bloomian "strong poet" enable us to engage in
social inquiry, or allow social and cultural development as a consciously directed
process to continue?
The gain in retaining Dewey's view of scientific method is found in his
emphasis on "doing of a physical and overt sort."35 This emphasis is manifest in
wedding theory and practice, which is fundamental to Dewey's work, and would be·
lost or distorted without retaining his understanding of the role of scientific inquiry in
social discourse and ethical deliberations. "All experimentation involves overt doing"
which is "not a random activity, but is directed by ideas which have to meet the
conditions set by the need of a problem. "36 This emphasis on activity that is not
random is distinctly different than the task set for pragmatism in Rorty's view.
Deweyan pragmatism is far from an ad hoc play of language games which sees some
metaphors die off and some literalized, or put to use as part of the language. Dewey's
pragmatism is a process philosophy, although the underlying environment from which
problems emerge is, admittedly, a combination of things that contingently e�st, that
happen to be due to the interplay of forces which are not part of a pre-conceived
process, (a non-teleological environment). Further, retaining scientific method in the
Deweyan canon restores "integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the
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world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct
his conduct. "37 Dewey wishes to have scientific inquiry serve as a component for a
social discourse on the nature of the normative commitments that a community shares.
This is a bold directive that Dewey thinks is the obligation of any community. It is
unclear to what extent this discourse should be oriented toward private commitments.
It is quite clear that to the extent the community maintains active public commitments,
as all shared living arrangements do to some extent, Dewey's method of inquiry into
social problems appears to be a fruitful component of the discourse directed towards
public commitments. The central task Dewey envisions for his understanding of
philosophy, which incorporates scientific inquiry, is to understand our beliefs about the
world "due to natural science, and our beliefs about values - using that word to
designate whatever is taken to have rightful authority in the direction of conduct. "38
What is clearly gained by retaining these aspects of Dewey's work is the awareness of
our capacity to maintain a systematic discourse within our community concerning the
nature of the community's public normative commitments. What is also gained is a
similar awareness of the ability of our private, parochial sentiments to have a
destabilizing, dis-integrating impact upon social discourse. Dewey's method is meant
to remove from public discourse those parochial sentiments that would prejudice an
individual's or group's input. The result would be a form of discourse that at least
manifests an overt awareness of the impact of parochial sentiments on a community's
ability to coalesce around a set of public commitments. Dewey's theory of intelligent
action, as seen explicitly in the lecture entitled "The Naturalization of Intelligence" in
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The Quest for Certainty, is meant to determine the consequences of actions that are
enjoyed to see if these enjoyments can rise to the status of a value.39 This would be a
step removed from the belief structures present in society which consider values as
such simply because they are enjoyed. Dewey argues on this point that the scientific
revolution discredited "the notion of an act whether of sense or thought which
supplied a valid measure of thought in immediate knowledge ...consequences of
operations became the important thing."40 As a result of the scientific revolution, a
known object became that which is experienced after experimental "variation and
redisposition" has altered it.41 What is clear here is that Dewey's expressed
understanding of the role his pragmatism plays in helping to shape public normative
discourse is altogether different than the role which critics, such as Horkheimer in the
previous chapter, have understood Dewey to play in the shaping of mass material
culture by scientism, or "subjective reason" seen as an outgrowth of Kantian
epistemology. Dewey's view of the scientific revolution is altogether different than
that of his critics. From his view of this revolution:
the suggestion almost imperatively follows that escape from the defects of
transcendental absolutism is not to be had by setting up as values enjoyments
that happen anyhow, but in defining value by enjoyments which are the
consequences of intelligent action. 42
These admonitions are quite the opposite of what Dewey's critics take from his work,
and I have here in mind Horkheimer and those of similar perspective. For Dewey, the
issues "involve nothing less than the directed reconstruction of economic, political, and
religious institutions. "43
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How can Rorty's understanding ofpragmatism as a linguistic practice retain
Dewey's required (methodical) inquiry into the alleviation of social problems? Ifwe
remove methodical inquiry from Dewey's "spirit ," aren't we losing the quintessential
Dewey? How can the "strong poet," an idea which Rorty takes from the work of
Harold Bloom, retain the ability to engage in the task that Dewey has set for the
pragmatic philosopher?44 It seems clear from the perspective ofthis exposition that he
cannot. However, Rorty does not think that such inquiry is the sole province ofthe
philosopher. Rather, he feels that "this function is that ofhigh culture in general rather
than philosophy in particular.',45 My criticism ofRorty with respect to his denial ofthe
need for the socially active philosopher to engage the problems ofthe community is
that the philosopher's replacement in the Rortian scheme by the strong poet
presupposes the sort ofliberal democratic society that Dewey envisioned as the
product ofhis pragmatism. This presupposition on Rorty's part is revealed in his
discussion ofthe nature ofthis strong poet.
This type ofperson is a "relatively leisured language user--all ofus who have
,,
the equipment and the time for fantasy. 46 Obviously such leisured language users
require the luxuries prevalent in a technologically advanced liberal society. They
require the backdrop ofa community in which social organization is so advanced and
specialized that this group ofindividuals, perhaps a class ofindividuals, has the luxury
offree time and presumably an education which allows them to have a critical
perspective on cultural history as well as contemporary society. Rorty clearly
disagrees with my description ofthe requirements ofhis "strong poet." He believes
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we can all lead a life of creative self-reinvention, or self-overcoming. He claims,
following Philip Reiff, that Freudian psycho-analysis "democratized genius by giving
everyone a creative unconscious."
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This perspective allows us to see that "the

intellectual is just a special case...of what other people do...to dramatize and crystallize
(their) sense of self-identity".,,4s The problem for this writer is that it is altogether
unclear how this absolutely democratized sense of creative intelligence has anything to
do with Rorty's assertions that the philosopher's role today is as one more of many
types of cultural critics. His examples of the myriad of types of lifestyles in which an
individual can gain a sense of self-identity through re-description does not square with
the particular intellectual requirements of the role of the "cultural critic." It appears
then that this focus on the creativity of individuals in Rortian pragmatism does not
square with the role of creative intelligence in Deweyan pragmatism. It then follows
that Rorty's assertion that we should edit Deweyan pragmatism according to the
requirements of Rorty's linguistic pragmatism is in error because such editing will not
in fact retain the "spirit" of Dewey as Rorty claims it would.
The metaphors which Rorty's strong poet has the freedom and luxury to create
allow him to:
make the past itself, including those very causal processes which blindly
impress all (of his) behavings, bear (his individual) impress. Success in that
enterprise - the enterprise of saying 'Thus I willed it' to the past is success in
what Bloom calls giving birth to oneself 49
What is so obviously lacking in these descriptions of this new type of individual is that
there is no emphasis on what the strong poet contributes to the community. This is of
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great importance because Dewey is concerned, as seen below, with the contributions
of individuals such as philosophers and social scientists to the community seen as a
project in common. It might arguably be the case that the existence of such "strong
poets" in a community serves as a litmus test for whether or not a community is in fact
a liberal democracy. However, what this description of the ideal sort of existence for
Rorty reveals is the fundamental difference between his and Dewey's view of what
creative intelligence is, and the consequent role of creative intelligence in society.
Following Dewey, I see Rorty's version of creative intelligence as an
individualism inherited from a "pre-scientific, pre-technological age" in which Lockean
concepts, such as the "idea that property and reward were intrinsically individual"
flourished. "50 Rortian creative intelligence is an anachronistic analog of that older
version of individualism which is the cause, Dewey argues, of that "profound split"
between creative intelligence and the social benefit that can be brought about through
its application to social projects. 51 Dewey states that:
A stable recovery of individuality waits upon an elimination of the older
economic and political individualism, an elimination which will liberate
imagination and endeavor for the task of making corporate society contribute
to the free culture of its members: 52
The emphasis on creative intelligence in Deweyan pragmatism is oriented towards its
role in contributing to society. The emphasis on creative intelligence in Rortian
pragmatism is oriented towards individual gain. Rorty's creative individual looks
inward, contributing to the separation of individual creative agency from the need to
engage in the community as a project in common. The Rortian, who is oriented
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toward seeking his own identity, is an example of that "lost individual" who, while
being "caught up into a vast complex of associations" tries to break free of them into
order to re-invent himself, all the while lacking a "harmonious and coherent reflection
of the import of these connections (in his) imaginative and emotional outlook on
life. "53 If an individual was even capable of breaking free from these associations, he
would, according to Dewey, be a "monstrosity," for it is "absurd to suppose that the
ties which hold them together are merely external and do not react into mentality and
character, producing the framework of personal disposition."54 It is clear from this
that Dewey's perspective on the role of individual creative agency is that it flourishes
in and through those associations that make up a community. While the Rortian may
co-exist with the Deweyan in such a community, each clearly plays an altogether
different role in the function of that community. It follows from this that Rorty's task
is better served in avoiding appropriating those things he finds useful in Deweyan
pragmatism and editing the rest. I think Rorty might more effectively show how his
pragmatist, his strong poet, compliments the Deweyan pragmatist, rather than showing
how the Rortian "overcomes" the Deweyan.
It is clear from this analysis that Rortian pragmatism and Deweyan pragmatism,
as Bernstein suggests, both exhibit a common sub-current of ideas that may loosely fall
under the rubric "pragmatic thought." However, it is also clear that Rortian
pragmatism is not a better, or more advanced form of pragmatism which holds greater
pertinence for contemporary culture. It simply does not serve the purpose Dewey's
work was meant to serve. Rortian pragmatism does not address the need to remedy
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social ills; rather it presupposes that these ills have already been remedied, or that they
are not the concern of his strong poet. Rorty cannot appropriate aspects of Dewey's
work and edit the rest, particularly the features and functions of scientific method,
without losing the spirit of Dewey which he professes to wish to save.
Deweyan scientific method in the service of social inquiry is meant to free
social discourse from those parochial sentiments which divide communities, by
providing an intersubjective forum where social policy can be created without the
distortions inherent in political discourse that operate on the level of rhetorical
gamesmanship for the benefit of the individual politician and his constituency. The
function of scientific method is absolutely quintessential to Deweyan pragmatism, as it
is part of Dewey's program for the freeing of social discourse in this manner. Editing
it from what we retain of Dewey is editing that which is truly Deweyan.

CHAPTERIV
ETHICS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Dewey's argument that ethics and scientific method are one is founded upon
the naturalistic basis of his philosophy. Dewey grounds ethics thoroughly in the world
of experience and observation, without reducing moral laws to natural laws. The
scientific attitude in inquiry enhances any deliberative effort concerning the world of
experience. If ethics are so concerned, then deliberations concerning right action are
also enhanced by scientific methods of inquiry. I will show that if knowledge gained
through scientifically rigorous inquiry requires experimentation, and ethical
deliberation is made more effective by scientific methods, it follows from Dewey's
argument that experimentation with the possibilities of right action is likewise
required. This leads to Dewey's position on social and political matters, as seen in the
next chapter. His position ultimately calls for experimentation with practices and
institutions that we deem democratic on a scale not seen in our society. However, as
described at the end of this chapter, Dewey's experimental methods of inquiry into the
best political institutions and practices are limited by what I describe as an organic
order postulate which stipulates antecedent criteria of the good society.
Dewey grounds moral theory in reflection occurring when "men are confronted
with situations in which different desires promise opposed goods. " 1 Dewey opposes
this "reflective morality" to "customary morality," the latter of which "places standards
46
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and rules of conduct in ancestral habit. "2 The standards developed through reflective
moral theorizing are contingent, changing according to the conditions of a given
situation. Dewey states that "definitive injunctions...cannot proceed from (reflective
morality). "3 This sense of contingency, and the idea that moral standards should be set ·
according to conditions, are both very important elements in Dewey's argument. The
crises he sees in society are due to the application of unreflective, or customary
morality to a state of affairs in which it is ineffective. He argues that "there are
periods in history when a whole community or a group...finds itself in the presence of
new issues which its old customs do not adequately meet.,,4 These are periods of
change on a grand scale, as seen in "Greece following the time of Pericles..., that of
the Jews after their captivity...,(and) the present...with the vast social changes which
have followed the industrious expansion of the machine age."5 Advances on the scale
seen in our machine age must be met by advances in the value system through which
we define our activities, and ultimately ourselves. There is a genuine danger in
maintaining an ethics based upon the antecedent conditions in which customary
morality originates. Dewey cryptically describes these dangers as "the force of new
conditions (producing) disruption externally and mechanically.,,6 What this is meant to
describe is a state of affairs in which technological advances have created the capacity
for activities that have not been held in check by the types of deliberation and control
Dewey advocates. These activities extend from new methods of economic, political
and social oppression, to destruction of the environment, and mass genocide. Moral
theory, based upon the programmatic principles Dewey advocates, is meant to be a
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counter-measure to these activities, to whatever extent possible. Its goal is to
"generalize the types of moral conflicts which arise, state the leading ways in which
such problems have been intellectually dealt with, ( and) render personal reflection
7
more systematic and enlightened. " The values that emerge from such a program are

intended to be the products of sound judgment, in the sense that scientific inquiry is
the basis of sound deliberations as to empirical matters. Dewey points out that this
method of making judgments is "about the conditions and the results of experienced
objects; about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections, and
enjoyments. "8
Dewey's naturalistic philosophy is derived from the premise that an "organism
9

is part of the natural world; its interactions with it are genuine additive phenomena. "
This assertion refers to Dewey's criticism of subjectivism, specifically the spectator

theory of knowledge. It is important to point out Dewey's view that experience is in
as well as of this world. The world and the individual constantly interact. The
products of this interaction are genuine knowledge. Applied to moral theory, Dewey's
naturalism suggests that moral knowledge, for lack of a better description, is a product
of our interaction with the environment. The premises of moral principles are limited
to this world. "Problematic situations," moments in which moral deliberation is
required, ''when they are resolved then gain the meaning of all the relations which the
operations of thought have defined. " 10 What follows from this argument is that moral
knowledge is the product of understanding the consequences of our activities for the
relations we have with other things and individuals. There are no extra-worldly
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relations to which our activities must conform. However, the consequences of our
activities are evaluated according to secular humanist principles as the antecedent
criteria of the good. These principles are thoroughly grounded in this world, relying
on the methods of science and reason; therefore they are secular, or naturalistic.
These principles also take account of the freedom, welfare, and equality of other
individuals as the chief operative principles guiding our interactions with them;
therefore the principles are humanistic. These criteria of the good are the foundations
of Dewey's naturalism.
What convinces Dewey that the natural world is the effective limit of the
relations of our activities is empirical observation. What I mean here by effective
limits of our observations is two things. Firstly, right action and moral deliberation
have no theological or extra-worldly reference point. Secondly, this naturalistic aspect
of Dewey's moral theory does not create a subject/object dichotomy, and its attendant
skeptical dilemmas, the product of which are unresolvable moral puzzles. Since we
see that our decision-making processes, when acted upon in the world, have effects
that solve our dilemmas or problems, "the supposed grounds for opposing human
experience to the reality of nature disappear."11 Dewey's argument is not only meant
to do away with subjectivist dilemmas of a philosophical as well as moral kind, it is
also meant to counter the claim that his own position could be considered subjectivist.
Dewey argues that the real is in the environment, and not merely within the mind.
Experiences are within the world because "situations have problematic and resolved
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characteristics in and through actual interactions of the organism and the
environment. " 12
Dewey sees ''the real" as a process that is in a state of continuous flux. It is
within this flux, this "union in Nature of the settled and the unsettled", that moral
theory gains significance. 13 This is particularly important to Dewey's theory, because
this argument extends to the reduction of ideals and ends to real entities within the
process of acting upon unsettled conditions in the environment. Ideals and ends are
thoroughly grounded within this world, as part of our interaction with it. They gain
significance only as part of this interaction, as means to further ends. This union of the
ideal and the real in Dewey's naturalism is important because it emphasizes the ability
of human activity to achieve goals, which means here the alleviation of problems
arising in unsettled situations. This includes times when sweeping social changes
require new methods of control. The emphasis on this ability illustrates Dewey's
optimism concerning social progress, the origins of which are seen in his
understanding of the transformative power of ideas, and the power of the
Enlightenment in shaping the course of human events.
To summarize so far, knowing how to resolve a dilemma between competing
and opposed goods is a problem for reflective moral theory, according to Dewey.
This theory is based solely upon knowledge acquired through interactions between
individuals, the environment, and their received tradition. Intelligent methods, which
are those using scientific forms of inquiry, make efforts at knowing how to resolve
problems in moral theory more effective.
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Dewey's discussion of "the nature and office of principles" further illustrates
his moral theory. 14 It shows the conjunction between an understanding of methods
and ethics as contingent upon the needs of the times, but it also shows that "the
intellectually cumulative effect" of experience and tradition serves as reference points
in moral deliberations. 15 Dewey's discussion highlights ·a distinction between rules and
principles, which builds upon his argument that social and political institutions must
change according to the needs of a given time.
Dewey's distinction between rules and principles further illustrates his view of
reflective moral theory. "Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things.
But principles are intellectual; they are the final methods used in judging suggested
courses of action. " 16 The application of rules is effective in certain cases where habit
provides the course of action required to complete a task. The nature of this method
of accomplishing tasks makes it ineffective in responding to changing circumstances.
By Dewey's definition, rules are inapplicable in cases they haven't been designed to
deal with. He defines principles as standpoints from which to judge circumstances. 17
Principles are malleable, whereas rules are hard and fast according to Dewey.
Principles "provide a consistent point of view... but (they) do not pretend to determine
in advance precisely what constitutes the general welfare or the common good." 18
This point extends not only to antecedent moral principles; it also extends to Dewey's
argument that political institutions and practices should not stand as static monoliths.
The dynamic, always contingent nature of historical processes requires that society
accepts that its institutions and practices will always be in the process of becoming
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antiquated, and that amendment of institutions and practices is a necessary feature of
historical change.
This need for "constant revision and expansion" concerns moral principles as
well as political institutions and practices. 19 Practices and measures manifest in
political institutions are of a fundamentally moral nature. Society's values, those
things it holds as good and proper, are to a great degree codified in the practices of its
political institutions. It follows then that change in moral principles to suit the times
requires a similar change in society's institutions.
Dewey asserts that moral knowledge must expand as man's activities expand. 20
Technological advances "assume moral import whenever they are discovered to have a
bearing on the common good."21 Any new application of technology has an impact
upon the lives of people, in Dewey's estimation. Since the application of scientific
knowledge, in the form of new technologies, to human affairs is a fundamentally moral
one from Dewey's point of view:
the great need of the present time is that the traditional barriers between
scientific and moral knowledge be broken down, so that there will be organized
and consecutive endeavor to use all scientific knowledge for humane and social
ends. 22
By applying Dewey's perspective on principle to social and political institutions
more closely, one can see his understanding ofjustice. Dewey asks, "What does
justice demand in the concrete?"23 Taken as a rule from Dewey's point of view,
justice means following the strict letter of the law with a minimum of flexibility and
interpretation (however dubious this method might sound in practice). However,
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taken as a principle, 'justice signifies the will to examine specific institutions and
measures so as to find out how they operate with the view of introducing greater
impartiality and equity into the consequences they produce. "24 Justice here is defined
as impartiality and equity in determining the outcome of legal matters. It is a
standpoint from which to survey a particular matter. Institutions and their methods
and procedures used for adjudicating legal matters are scrutinized for their ability to
afford an outcome that corresponds with the principles of justice. If the institutions
are ineffective in this regard, principles call for a revision of institutions and processes
in order to allow for the realization of society's understanding of a just outcome. The
way institutional effectiveness is determined is by using the best methods of inquiry at
society's disposal for surveying the possible outcomes of the choices available, given a
particular set of institutions and practices. If the choices available within a particular
institutional framework do not allow for the closest approximation to a just outcome
possible, they must be revised in a manner that will do so. This scenario illustrates
precisely how Dewey sees moral principles developing. They are realized in practice
through empirical testing and observation, and are not oriented toward anything
beyond our interaction with nature and society.
One last point about Dewey's view of principles addresses issues taken up with
Rorty in chapter two above. Dewey emphasizes that principles or standards, "as a
standpoint for survey of situations allows free play to the imagination in reaching new
insights. "25 This is precisely what Rorty envisions the Bloornian "strong poet" doing.
What Rorty fails to take notice of in his criticism of Dewey's emphasis on method, is
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that Dewey's theory allows for the creative life of the individual, and the culture as a
whole, to freely imagine and develop new possibilities of existence. This is Rorty's
concern, but it is also Dewey's. Dewey's perspective on principles and methods
"requires, rather than merely permits, continual advance in the conception of what
constitutes happiness in the concrete."26 The fundamental difference lies in Rorty's
emphasis on the individual's self-centered re-creation, or re-description, and Dewey's
emphasis on the creative potential of individuals as members of an organic community
that benefits from the growth of individuals as much as they do. Rorty is more
concerned, as his emphasis on the anxiety of the "strong poet" indicates, with the
ability of the individual to break free from the influences and impresses of his
forbearers, so as to re-create himself in an image of his own design. 27 This anxiety
comes from the possibility of not being able to break free of one's culture and
tradition, and form a one's own description of oneself. lfRorty could account for this
similarity between his and Dewey's theory, concerning the play ofcreative and
imaginative forces, he might possibly reassess Dewey's theory in a new light.
The following questions might arise concerning the relations between received
tradition and intelligent methods: Don't we engage in moral deliberation all the time?
Why do I, as an individual or as a member of a community, need to be taught how to
engage in moral deliberation? A response to these questions from a Deweyan
perspective would initially find it absurd to suppose that antecedently known goods, or
received tradition, could serve without revision as an effective reference point for
judging conditions that are in continuous flux. An individual who poses questions

55
such as these, Dewey might argue, is engaged in applying customary morality to
problematic situations, and doing so rather poorly if one judges the effects on society
of doing so by his standards. ''Morals are ineradicably empirical," Dewey asserts. 28
His conclusions call for a reorientation of moral deliberation away from attitudes such
as those of the above questioner who suggests that customary moral deliberation
fulfills the requirements of moral theory. "Since morals is concerned with conduct, it
grows out of specific empirical facts. "

29

The specificity and immediacy of a scenario

that requires moral deliberation does not lend itself solely to the application of
antecedent principles. Every era that has experienced profound social and
environmental changes has to come to grips with the crises caused by the
ineffectiveness of antecedent principles in controlling new conditions. The perspective
of the above questioner, Dewey might argue, stems from an ignorance of the forces at
work in new conditions. It might also originate in the inability to detach oneself
psychologically from the perceived security of a previous era, when one's set of values
had an effective force in the world. Furthermore, such questions ignore the fact that
we are taught "morals" as a matter of our upbringing and socialization, either directly
or indirectly. The problem is that the customary morality we are taught is ineffective
in meeting the needs of current conditions. Dewey points out that, "even the most
comprehensive deliberation leading to the most momentous choice only fixes a
disposition which has to be continuously applied in new and unforeseen conditions, re
adapted by future deliberations."30 This may lead to a feeling of insecurity, of having
never gained a sense of certainty in moral principles. However, Dewey finds this
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constant searching for right principles of action geared towards ever-changing
circumstances to have a positive side. He asks, "Does this ( constant moral
deliberation) reduce moral life to the futile toil of a Sisyphus?"31 Part of his answer is
that it is not a futile exercise, but one that "keeps activity alive, ( and) growing."32 I
will show in the next chapter that this constant re-adaptation through an on-going
process of deliberation is precisely how Dewey thinks democracy, and community, are
to be kept alive.
Scientific modes of inquiry make public policy decision-making in a multi
faceted community more possible. They do so by providing intersubjectively
transrnissable criteria that form a basis for a common perspective from which to
approach policy problems. Dewey points out the strength of scientific method in this
regard:
the fundamental advantage of framing our account of the processes of knowing
on the pattern of what occurs in experimental inquiry is that nothing is
introduced save what is objective and is accessible to examination and
import. 33
What Dewey means by "objective" is the principle of the intersubjectivity of criteria
mentioned above. This is evident elsewhere, as when Dewey states that with the
transfer "of experimental method from physics to man...all tenets and creeds about
good and goods would be recognized to be hypotheses...to be tested and
confirmed...they would lose all pretense of finality."34 The application of this principle
to community concerns, and hence to community itself, since the nature of a
community is seen to be intimately related to its concerns, would provide a counter-
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measure to the parochial interests brought to public dialogue. It is Dewey's firm
conviction that such "change would do away with the intolerance and fanaticism that
attend the notion that beliefs and judgments are capable of inherent truth and
authority. "35
Some groups in society will not be open to having their values tested as mere
hypotheses. There are a number of groups currently residing in our society that would
fight to defend their principles as inherently true. 36 However, I must reiterate that
Dewey's program is only applicable to liberal-democratic societies. Those that will
not conform to liberal-democratic principles are not part of this program. Being open
minded is a necessary pre-condition for entering into such a dialogue. This is achieved
through a fundamental change in how individuals are educated and socialized, which is
a project that is inseparable from achieving the democratic society Dewey envisions.
The educational component of Dewey's vision is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it might suffice to say that its intentions are "to foster those impulses and
habits which experience has shown to make us...impartial in perceiving the tendencies
of our...activities. "37 Complete impartiality in perceiving the tendencies of our own
activities is obviously unattainable. However, the extent to which it is attainable is the
extent to which Dewey's goals are approximated. Conversely, this extent is also a
limiting factor in realizing those goals.
Experimental method "meets the conditions of the present situation" by serving
as the basis for a re-definition of values with a view toward controlling future events. 38
It does so through the analysis of the consequences of directed action.39 Through such
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methods, the "conception ofvalue" is defined causally and operationally. 40 This is
meant to move moral theory beyond the definition and classification ofactions as good
and bad, towards prediction ofpossible choices as better or worse. This is an
important distinction between a forward looking, "reflective morality," and a
backward looking, "customary morality." It is precisely how scientific methods are
reflected in Deweyan ethics. Both have the ultimate goal ofpredicting events.
Rigorously developed ethical deliberations would strive towards having the predictive
capacity ofscience from this perspective. Dewey thought this method would provide
for a very powerful form ofcommunity decision-making. It is a fundamental
component ofwhy he thought public dialogue has the capacity to deal with the issues
a technologically complex society faces.
It was stated above that principles developed through reflective moral
theorizing are contingent upon the particular conditions ofa given situation. There is
another important, fundamental element in Dewey's moral theory that clearly
differentiates it from relativistic moral theories. Dewey's moral theory is founded
implicitly on antecedent criteria ofthe good that I describe as an organic order
postulate. I describe the foundations ofDewey's moral theory this way for several
reasons. His moral theory cannot be described as resting upon a natural order
postulate. As stated at the beginning ofthis chapter, Dewey does not reduce moral
laws to natural laws. Accordingly, Dewey does not think nature informs man's
activities deterministically. Rather, Dewey sees man's activities reshaping nature
according to man's needs to such an extant that the environment is conditioned by,
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and in tum conditions, man's existence. This organic, or even symbiotic interaction
between man and nature in Dewey's theory makes it impossible to describe the
foundations of Dewey's moral theory as a natural order postulate without introducing
contradictions in one's understanding of Dewey's theory as a whole.
The particular cultural tradition which implicitly informs Dewey's
understanding of reflective moral theorizing by serving as the antecedent criteria of the
good, as the organic order postulate itself, is secular humanism. Dewey's reflective
moral theory is flexible according to conditions. However, it is clear that Dewey's
moral theory is not relativistic. Secular humanism, as Dewey's organic order
postulate, provides antecedent criteria to which reflective moral theory must conform.
Critics such as Horkheimer have not taken notice of the organic order
postulate that is fundamental to Dewey's moral theory. If Dewey's critics had done
so, the charges of relativism and instrumentalism levelled at Dewey might have been
dropped. If Dewey had been more explicit about his antecedent criteria of the good,
his moral theory might have been assessed by his critics differently.

CHAPTER V
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXPERIMENTALISM
Dewey's political philosophy dissolves the formal boundaries of scientific
method and ethics. His view is that scientific, rigorously methodical inquiries are the
best ways for communities to determine what is right for them. This is coupled with
the idea that individuals should have as much access to the political system as possible.
These principles are meant to serve as the foundation of a discourse about public
values. Such a discourse would allow for an ongoing inquiry into the nature of
community , asking what community is, and what we want from it individually and
collectively.
There are particular prerequisites for arriving at the position where these
foundational principles can be put in practice. It is this writers contention that these
prerequisites form a substantial component of what holds enduring value in Dewey's
work. These are that there must be a continual re-visioning, through the best means
possible, of individuality and community in order to achieve the greatest
approximation of the ideal of democracy as possible. Secondly, the vitality of the
struggle to approximate the ideal of democracy in practice is perpetuated through
maintaining a rigorously designed experimental procedure as part of the political
process. Thirdly, since culturally produced perspectives on the nature of individuality

60

61
and community have profound effects on society, they can have massively
degenerative effects on democracy ifthey are not in keeping with contemporary needs.
The most pressing issue this nation must concern itselfwith, Dewey argues, is
"the creation ofdemocracy...which is now as urgent as it was...when the most
experienced and wisest men ofthe country gathered ...to create the structure ofa self
governing society." 1 The conditions within which this creative enterprise must take
place have changed drastically since the days ofthe founding fathers. The founding
fathers and "new physical circumstances" had come together in a "marvelous
conjunction" ofgood fortune which provided the means to "re-adapt the older
institutions and ideas to meet (new) situations."2 Dewey thinks the drastically different
circumstances this nation is confronted with have made the frontiers ofhuman growth
a moral problem, as opposed to problems created by the founding era's physical
frontier.
The earlier concern with shaping the physical frontier ofthis nation has been
replaced with the need to expand the creative democratic enterprise into the moral
frontier.3 It is a moral frontier, Dewey argues, because the waste ofresources and
energy in his day were those ofindividuals who were denied the possibility ofmaking
the contributions to their own lives and the vitality ofthe community they are capable
of 4 Dewey thinks this problem exists because "for a long period we have acted as if
our democracy were something that perpetuated itselfautomatically; as ifour
ancestors had succeeded in setting up a machine that solved the problem ofperpetual
motion in politics. "5 I think Dewey's connection between stagnant political
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institutions and the need to expand the creative democratic enterprise to moral
frontiers is found in the need to open up avenues for personal and communal growth
for all individuals in all spheres of social and political life. Dewey states that
"everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up barriers that
divide human beings into sets and cliques, into antagoni.stic sects and factions, and
6
thereby undermines the democratic way of life. " Revision of political institutions,

with the purpose of making them more inclusive, and making them a forum where
differences can be communicated and varying perspectives heard, is fundamental to
redressing the problem of wasting the nation's human resources.
This argument illustrates Dewey's thesis that "democracy is a moral ideal."7 It
is not, as he declares, "something institutional and external" that will run as a machine
unimpeded without a particular set of beliefs and way of life being carried on by the
citizens who are actually the source of democracy. 8 Democratic faith as a guide to life
is presented by Dewey as the following "philosophical position."9 It is:
the belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods
by which further experience will grow in ordered richness...the faith that the
process of experience is more important than any result attained, so that special
results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order
the ongoing process. 10
This process, alluded to here in the most general of terms, is the manifestation of the
vitality of democracy in practice. It is a constantly growing, nurturing experience that
is vital for the individual and the community. If the vitality of democracy is stifled, so
is that of the community, and vice versa. This argument exhibits precisely why the
waste of human resources through the effects of oppression, or exclusion from
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political and social life by other means, is a moral problem. It also illustrates why the
inquiry into developing vital democratic processes is a moral inquiry. Questions
concerning the extent to which political institutions approximate democratic ideals are
moral questions. Scientifically rigorous modes of inquiry into achieving as much of
the democratic ideal in practice as possible are inquiries of a moral nature.
What does the alleviation of this fundamentally moral predicament require? It
requires cooperation on the part of all citizens ''by giving differences a chance to show
themselves because...(this is) not only a right of other persons but (it) is a means of
enriching one's own life experience," as well as the community's.11 Tolerance and
acceptance of difference is a "release and enrichment" that provides for the ongoing
growth of a vital democracy. 12
Dewey is well aware that he may be charged with asserting "a set of moral
commonplaces" but his "only reply is that (this) is just the point in saying them." 13 He
emphasizes these apparently commonplace moral assertions because they are
essentially neglected through the complacency of individuals who perceive of
democracy as a perfected set of institutional machinery when, he would argue,
democracy is fundamentally grounded in maintaining the democratic beliefs described
above in one's daily life. The re-invigoration of this belief system is a "task that has to
be carried on day by day." 14 Furthermore, Dewey adds that "Since it is one that can
have no end till experience itself comes to an end, the task of democracy is forever that
of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all
contribute." 15
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Those elements of Dewey's political theory that are important today center
around dealing with issues faced by a complex, highly heterogeneous society. He
proposed, in a very general form, a set of relatively flexible methods that may help to
find resolutions to the crises facing modem liberal democratic communities. These
methods are intended to be combined with public evaluation of social problems in
order to gain a practically and normatively grounded understanding of community.
It is often stated that certain historical city-states such as ancient Athens had
the capacity to sustain a 'democratic' form of government through high levels of
participation combined with access limited to an elite. The scale of the myriad of
demands placed upon a modem democratic society was not even closely approximated
in ancient Athens for a number of reasons beyond the scope of this paper. One can see
in Rousseau's social contract theory that the only way his version of government can
be seen as democratic is if the society itself is absolutely homogeneous. Even then, as
Rousseau had anticipated through his construction of the "general will," there are a
number of problems with his model.
One of the many prescriptions for the ailments caused by the incapacity of
large and complex nation-states to maintain democracy, described so in a very limited
fashion, calls for limiting access to the political system. 16 This would be expected to
decrease the range of demands placed on the system, thereby making it more
manageable. Another alarming phenomenon is a virulent form of nationalism that calls
for a move towards the exclusive nation-state as the panacea that will bring about
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solidarity and community. 17 One of many conceivable consequences of these
prescriptions is that societies will move towards totalitarian systems of government.
Dewey seeks increased participation through limiting the demands placed upon
the political system by interests grounded in parochial beliefs. His prescription would
ideally expect that all members of society would conform to a set of intersubjectively
transmissible criteria by which a community decision-making and public values
discourse can be created. As will be seen below, this is accomplished through a
wedding of scientific procedures and a normative discourse, together with an
information gathering and dissemination network that will allow (ideally) the greatest
number of citizens to participate in the community as a project in common.
Dewey placed a great emphasis on the role played by a technocracy that
possesses the proficiency required to disseminate information to society at large. The
technocracy's role, in Dewey's view, is to help develop and inform the discourse on
community by providing information concerning the negative consequences of social
relations, meaning everything from criminal activity to those Kafkaesque processes of
massive systems that cause individuals to be lost in the bureaucratic machine. This
civil service would act to explain and predict the consequences of social interaction, so
that those things individuals enjoy in these interactions can be tested systematically to
determine if they can rise to the status of a public value. With all this said, Dewey's
vision of how national bureaucracies of experts work together with citizen's local
governments is unclear, and quite puzzling. How the raw material of politics, i.e.
information, is handled by national bureaucracies, while still being the object of local
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concerns is also puzzling. What is not puzzling is that scientific principles are meant to
guide the collection and dissemination of the raw material of politics. Therefore, it
appears that this part of politics, its raw material, is not to be part of the political
process at all. Instead, it is meant to be public, open to verification, and complete. All
of these points raise significant issues that Dewey did not explore.
It would be a mistake to attempt to put forth a definite summary of particulars
concerning the structure of political institutions, according to Dewey's conception of a
liberal democratic community. It would amount to a logical inconsistency to assert
that Dewey had a highly specific conception of what a liberal democratic community
would look like. Since the political institutions in a community are shaped by an
interaction of socio-cultural and institutional traditions, and the limits and resources of
a particular situation, any dogmatic assertion of a universally correct structure of the
institutions a society must possess in order to achieve a balance of individual freedoms
and communal concerns would clearly be a contradiction in Dewey's work. Dewey
thought that political institutions should change with circumstances in order to allow a
community to solve the problems that confront it. Dewey's theory emphasizes certain
important elements of the process through which a highly heterogeneous,
technologically complex, liberal democratic society can successfully tackle the
problems of how to assure human freedom in the context of associated living.
There are definite formal limits to Dewey's theory that must be differentiated
from the particular examples of institutions he chose to highlight, in order to see what
value Dewey's insights have for democracies at the beginning of the twenty first
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century. It is this writer's contention that Dewey's political theory is very much a
foundational one, being strictly limited to a generalized outline of some of the methods
or processes involved in attaining a balance between individual freedom and
communally oriented society. As will be seen below, Dewey favors a New England
town meeting style of government, combined with a federal government that oversees
the operations of a technocracy, and a large public infrastructure. However, these
institutions are not, as I contend, part of the formal limits of his political theory.
Rather, they are examples of what he thought would be a set of effective political
institutions for his time. I think that Dewey meant his political theory to be as flexible,
and thereby as minimally historically situated, as possible. What I mean by this is
related to my position that the formal limits of his theory are concerned with processes
that require the addition of scientific, cultural, material, and like factors of a particular
time and place in order for it to be elaborately applied in practice, as when a
community asks: What does this mean for us? Those who contend that the examples
Dewey uses to illustrate his position expose society to further dangers, and are
idealistic, have missed his contributions to democratic theory.
It is important to emphasize this position for several reasons. The examples of
political institutions Dewey uses to elaborate his argument, if taken as necessary
components of his theory, might allow some serious, possibly insurmountable
objections to be raised. Consequently, what may otherwise be considered an
important legacy would be shelved as an historical curiosity. These objections center
around Dewey's emphasis on town meeting style government, and the role of a
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centralized technocracy. As we will see later, these objections are based on a logically
inconsistent rendering of Dewey's theory.
Dewey's emphasis on increasing the role of local government does not also
entail a decrease in the role of the federal system. I do not think that Dewey sought a
devolution of power in order to gain an increase in the role of local government in
politics. A critical response to Dewey's theory that suggests it calls for a devolution
of power implies that shifts in political power and effectiveness in political institutions
occur within a zero-sum game. Dewey would not suggest that politics in the United
States operates under a taut system. In fact, following the jargon of Albert 0.
Hirschman, Dewey would suggest that there is a great deal of "slack" in our political
system, meaning that the system is not operating as effectively as possible. 18 If the
political system is not operating under taut conditions, an increase in power and
responsibility at the local level does not entail a decrease in power at the federal level.
Since Dewey thinks our political system is not the closest approximation to the
democratic ideal as possible, he would not suggest that it is a taut system. Therefore,
the balance of political power and effectiveness does not resemble the conditions
occurnng m a zero-sum game.
Dewey's political theory stems from a series of foundational arguments that
serve the purpose of sweeping aside historical beliefs concerning the nature of
individuality, community, and democracy. This is necessarily first on Dewey's
agenda, because he thinks that the cultural conception of the individual and his
relationship to society at any given time has determined the nature of its socio-political
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institutions. By re-visioning the nature of the individual and political institutions as the
product of a given culture, Dewey hopes to lay the groundwork for a political process
that will connect the individual to community in a way that will allow for the greatest
human freedom. This is precisely why he advocates a reassessment of the conception
of community.
The transformative power of ideas weighs heavily in Dewey's philosophy. His
philosophy is that if fundamental attitudes can be changed through directed inquiry and
discussion of the range of possibilities in a given society, progress towards a greater
sense of community can be achieved. 19
The commonly held view that the problem of communal living is one to be
viewed in terms of an individual versus the collective dichotomy is the fundamental
fallacy that Dewey wants society to move beyond. This is necessary in order to
establish a practical, real world discourse on the nature of community. The overall
conclusion of Dewey's argument in this regard is that "the problem of freedom is a
problem to be viewed in the context of culture. "20 Dewey was concerned with framing
the problem of freedom, and not prescribing particular solutions. 21 "Solutions are idle
until the problem has been placed in the context of the elements that constitute culture
as they interact with elements of native human nature. "22 Furthermore, implicit in
Dewey's argument is the idea that the correct solutions to problems can only be
arrived at through a correct framing of the questions concerning them. Dewey's
criticism of what is regarded as human nature serves as one of the premises upon
which he poses his view of the problem of freedom.
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Dewey states that the prevailing psychological theories about human nature at
any one time are only the expressions of the particular historical moment in which they
were formed.
It is significant that human nature was taken to be strongly moved by an
inherent love of freedom at the time when there was a struggle for
representative government; that the motive of self-interest appeared when
conditions in England enlarged the role of money, because of new methods of
industrial production; that the growth of organized philanthropic activities
brought sympathy into the psychological picture, and that events today are
readily converted into the love of power as the mainspring of human action. 23
This example of Dewey's train of thought illustrates two things. It supports
his position that the culture of a particular period is what determines which of the
purported elements of human nature will be emphasized and therefore nurtured in that
culture. It further supports the conclusion that "the problem of freedom and of
democratic institutions is tied up with the question of what kind of culture exists; with
the necessity of free culture for free political institutions. "24
The notion of an exclusively individualistic human nature was not conceived of
as a basis for social action until the mid-eighteenth century. Dewey states that "in the
earlier periods of human history (cultural conditions) acted almost like physiological
conditions" as far as the perception of human nature was concerned. 25 Once "cultural
conditions were seen to be subject in some degree to deliberate formation," they led to
the problematic situation still facing us today, where conditions were developed
"which subordinated cooperativeness to liberty and equality, serving to explain the
decline in the two latter."26 The individualism spawned by these ideas expressed the
view that negative liberties will sustain democratic principles. This is part of the
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fallacious individual versus the collective context in which society's problems are
presented. It is the view that less government is inherently better, and that greater
individual freedom will bring society closer to the democratic ideal. Dewey thought
that Lockean and economic laissez-faire liberalism both filled particular purposes in
their time. However, the residual effects of Locke's and Smith's ideas in practice
create problems for a society that has outgrown the utility of these theories. As will be
seen below, Dewey's response is that this situation calls for the growth of positive
freedoms, taken to mean that among a government's responsibilities is the duty to
make society amenable to an individual's ability to achieve his creative capacity.
Dewey makes the commonly known case that ''Locke's version of liberalism
(was) that governments are instituted to protect the rights that belong to individuals
prior to the political organization of social relations. "27 This version of liberalism had
a purpose in serving the needs of a particular historical moment. It is a version of
social contract theory that was put forth in response to feudal government. The
problem is that it "bequeathed to later social thought a rigid doctrine of natural rights
inherent in individuals independent of social organization. "28 In the modem era,
where representative government has been achieved to some extent, democratic
governments are theoretically founded upon the basis of the individual as a component
of a collective. However, the legacy of Lockean principles causes society to see that
"the great enemy of individual liberty (is) government because of its tendency to
encroach upon the innate liberties of individuals. "29 This is the case, even though the
foundation that government is built upon in our representative democracy is made up
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ofprecisely those individuals whose liberties are encroached upon by government.
Furthermore, the natural rights basis ofLockean liberalism places the individual above
the collective, as ifthe individual were prior to and morally above the collective.
Lockean liberalism "defined the individual in terms ofliberties ofthought and action
already possessed by him in some mysterious ready-made fashion. "30 The theoretical
foundations this and other democracies were built upon swept away the historical
bond between the individual and the collective without replacing it with another
temporally suited one. Lockean social contract theory, from a Deweyan perspective,
was inherently problematic in this regard. In its orientation towards the accumulation
and protection ofprivate property, Lockean liberalism was a precursor to Adam
Smith's economic version ofliberalism, and its attendant problems. Notice here
Dewey's connection ofthe theoretical and the practical. It is a further example ofhis
view ofthe transformative power ofideas. Dewey argues, not altogether radically,
that political institutions were built upon ideas such as Locke's. It follows then,
according to this reasoning, that a revolution in ideas can have the profound positive
effect on democracy Dewey hopes to achieve. Hence the focus on changing the
conception ofindividuality and community becomes apparently necessary to him.
Dewey states that Smith's newer version ofliberalism "was concerned with the
release ofproductivity and exchange from a cumbrous complex ofrestrictions that had
the force oflaw."31 Laissez-faire liberalism's "effect was to subordinate political to
economic activity."32 However, the outcome oflaissez-faire economics only managed
to tum human productivity and creativity further away from the possibility of

73
producing any collective good, and more towards private gain at the expense of
others. Smith's hidden hand that benefits all who participate in the marketplace
resulted in economic and political changes that replaced previous feudal interests with
the new capitalistic interests, who "provided the intellectual justification of the status
quo."33 The result was that community became secondary to the marketplace.
Several problems emerged as a result of this version of liberalism. The
perception held by laissez-faire economists was that the marketplace would provide
for the needs of society. Dewey points out that "they overlooked the fact that in many
cases personal profit can be better served by maintaining artificial scarcity and by what
Veblen called systematic sabotage of production."34 Furthermore, minimally regulated
capitalistic forces managed to gain the above stated vested position in society
previously held by the nobility in feudal society against whom liberalism was originally
a reaction. Dewey states that laissez-faire economics "completely failed to anticipate
the bearing of private control of the means of production and distribution upon the
effective liberty of the masses in industry as well as in cultural goods. "35 When
manufacturing and local small trades began to be replaced by the forces of the
industrial revolution and mass production, laissez-faire liberalism became onerous in
its capacity to thwart community. Dewey states that the problem of liberalism was,
and still is, that it fails ''to grasp the historic position of the interpretation of liberty (it
puts) forth."36 The result is that liberalism, as well as democracy, ''was not conceived
as a moving thing, something that is attained only by continuous growth. "37
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What these social conditions call for, in Dewey's time as well as our own, is a
new understanding of individualism that moves beyond the socially fabricated tension
between the individual and the collective. A new individualism is called for that takes
better account of the consequences of social relations, the destructive impact on
community caused by free market forces, and economic laissez-faire liberalism.
Dewey insists that this ideal position can be approximated to the extent that the public
can be made aware of the capacity for individuals and their communities to have
harmonious relationships. Dewey states that "a stable recovery of individuality waits
upon an elimination of the older economic and political liberalism. "38 What this
recovery of individuality seeks to develop is a citizenry that is consciously aware of
itself as an integrated community. It is a recovery of those "lost individuals" who are
overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of society, and hence unaware of how their
membership in "a vast complex of associations" connects them to an integrated
whole. 39
How does one develop the awareness Dewey claims is required in order to
become part of an integrated community? Dewey thinks this was the major obstacle in
arriving at a position where the "Great Society" can develop into the "Great
Community.',40 Dewey is referring to a technologically advanced, liberal democracy
without a conscious awareness of its own growth or its sense of community when
referring to the "Great Society." The motivation behind Dewey's political theory is to
arrive at such a conscious awareness, thereby achieving the "Great Community."
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It is commonplace to state that the sheer complexity and speed of
technological change has outpaced our capacity to understand the impact it has on
society. Dewey quotes a somewhat humorous passage from Clarence Ayres to drive
this point home.
Our industrial revolution began, as some historians say, with half a dozen
improvements in the textile industry; and it took us a century to realize that
anything of moment had happened to us beyond the obvious improvement in
spinning and weaving. 41
It appears obvious to Dewey that the remedy for this situation involves society's
capacity to use science and technology, the development of which has led to the
present predicament, to grapple with the forces that have eroded our connections as a
community. One of the main points of Dewey's The Public and Its Problems is
concerned with harnessing scientific method for the sake of community. In this work,
Dewey makes the case that it is the duty of experts in technical matters to keep pace
with the impact of technological change, and to disseminate this information to the
public in a way that allows it to make informed choices concerning those things the
public values in the community.
In order to gain a better sense of what Dewey means by transforming the
"Great Society" into the "Great Community," we must first look more closely at his
vision of community. Community is defined as existing:
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as
good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of
the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being
just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. 42
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This quote requires a bit of unpacking. It contains a number of terms that are loaded
with meanings highly specific to Dewey's philosophy. The "good" and "goods shared
by all" refer to the understanding of "the good" and "value" seen in The Quest.for

Certainty. 43 Here, Dewey points out that the public goods he refers to are determined
through the use of what he describes as intelligent behavior, which consists of using
methods that aid in determining consequences of actions that are enjoyed to see if
these enjoyments can rise to the status of a public value. 44 When Dewey refers to
consequences being appreciated, he means using the capacity gained through a
scientific attitude to grasp the effect that our actions have upon society. The call to
have a scientific attitude is not so much a demand that everyone don a labcoat, as it is
a call for an actual discourse on community to take place at all. It is an admonition to
put aside archaic metaphysical and epistemological baggage, as well as parochial
beliefs that reduce the capacity to develop community. The scientific attitude is meant
to brush aside these things, and replace them with a discourse based upon
intersubjectively transmissible and empirically grounded methods of inquiry and
communication in order to gain control of this "Great Society" and move us as close
to an approximation of the "Great Community" as possible.
Positive aids, governmental programs that aid a person in achieving their
highest capacity, are a necessity in helping achieve whatever level of this communal
ideal that is possible. Dewey makes the case that what Walter Lippman described as
the "omni-competent" individual is an illusion. 45 Lippman's construct described a
person who can master everything necessary to overcome barriers to his accomplishing
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what he wishes.

Likewise, Aaron Wildavsky's redundantly described notion of

"intellectual cogitation," a process where a single individual can make complete
empirical inquiries and determine proper policy choices by them, is equally illusory.46
What is required, according to Dewey, is a set of institutions that will gather and
disseminate information to the public so that it can make informed choices concerning
public goods and right action.47 The first component of these requirements is
scientifically based. The second component, how scientific method is used for
practical, public purposes, is a normative one.
Dewey wants to make the case for positive freedoms which are enhanced
through the application of the information provided by civil institutions. Dewey points
out that:
no man and no mind was ever emancipated merely by being left alone.
Removal of formal limitations is but a negative condition; positive freedom is
not a state but an act which involves methods and instrumentalities for control
of conditions.48
The practical implications of this position are that some sort of institutional structures
are required in order to "control conditions." After elaborating on some of the
fundamental functions Dewey has in mind for such institutions, their scope and
complexity will lead this discussion into some of the problems Dewey's examples
ironically create for the community he is trying to envision.
As stated above, the role these institutions play in Dewey's theory is to provide
what is now a relatively amorphous public with the information it needs to develop
into a community that is consciously aware of, and engaged in controlling, the
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consequences of their interactions. Dewey states that the things these institutions
should be concerned with are:
matters like sanitation, public health, healthful and adequate housing,
transportation, planning of cities, regulation and distribution of immigrants,
selection of management personnel, right methods of instruction and
preparation of competent teachers, scientific adju_stment of taxation, efficient
management of funds, and so on. 49
This is a lengthy list of duties, suggesting that this civil service will be quite large.
Corresponding to this rather questionable growth in the reliance on a civil service is an
enhancement of the policy making responsibilities of localized political institutions.
Dewey thinks that a return to local forms of government, as illustrated by the
New England town meeting, will resolve several problems. Firstly, he thinks it would
contribute to a decrease in political apathy. Dewey states that "political apathy, which
is a natural product of the discrepancies between actual practices and traditional
machinery, ensues from inability to identify one's self with definite issues."50 It
follows from this, and other points in Dewey's argument, that an individual is more
likely to be politically engaged if he perceives political issues as coming home, in a
sense. Secondly, the reduction of the prevalence of what Dewey describes as "extra
legal" agencies would result from an increase in the responsibilities of local
government. 51 In such a large society as ours, a "centralizing movement" has gained
such momentum that "intermediary groups (have become) closest to the political
conduct of affairs. "52 These same forces, so clearly seen by Dewey as a problem,
continue to be so, as is evidenced by Dahl's treatment of the polyarchic forces that
have developed by the middle of this century, and the discussions of political apathy
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that ensue following every federal election at the end of this century. 53 Thirdly, Dewey
asserts that the "lack of personal liability to the electorate" of elected officials is a
problem associated with large central governments that would be counteracted by an
increase in the responsibilities of local governments. 54 Fourthly, Dewey thinks that a
restructuring of political institutions to enhance local government will allow for the
answers to several questions to develop. These are questions such as ''What is the
public? If there is a public, what are the obstacles in the way of its recognizing and
articulating itself?"55 If, as Dewey states, it is the case that ''the public is so
bewildered that it cannot find itself," and that the "American democratic polity was
developed out of genuine community life," it must be the case that an enhancement of
community life will allow the public to "find itself. "56 The route to arriving at the
position where the public is disclosed is made possible through a face to face discourse
on what the public is, what its concerns are, and where it should direct its activities as
a project in common. Through this process, the individual and the collective will
appear less distant from one another. As the individual has a greater capacity to
influence and direct the public policy choices that have an impact on his life, he or she
will have the capacity to see individuality harmoniously aligned with collectivity. This
is the implication of Dewey's theory. The perceived distance of the individual from
centralizing forces in government influences the degree to which the individual places
himself in opposition to the collective. It stands to reason that if this is the case, this
distance must be reduced.
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Criticism of Dewey's advocacy of a large technically oriented civil service
might conceivably focus around commonly held views about the nature of large scale
bureaucracies. Large scale bureaucracies have inherent characteristics that would
reduce the ability of government to respond to challenges brought about by changes in
society. Bureaucracies have a natural inclination toward reinforcing the status quo,
thereby counteracting the ability of political institutions to evolve in consonance with
contemporary needs. This natural inclination of bureaucracies is one of the problems
that Dewey wishes to address. A critic might hypothetically contend that if Dewey's
theory were placed in practice, it would only reinforce this inclination. In answering
this criticism, we must make clear an initial distinction between the roles played by the
civil service and other more political institutions. Dewey asserts that "Inquiry, indeed,
is a work which devolves upon experts. But their expertness is not shown in framing
and executing policies, but in discovering and making known the facts upon which the
former depend. "57 What Dewey clearly points out here and elsewhere is that policy
making is the responsibility of citizens and elected officials. Dewey thinks the role of
experts is not inextricably linked with politics or policy-making, as some critics might
contend. The claim to such an inextricable link flies in the face of the fact that a great
number of quantitative analysts employed in academic and government institutions
have no interest in becoming, or having a connection with, the policy-makers who use
the information these technical experts make available. Beyond that, technical experts
who are trained in normative analysis, and those who have expertise in anything more
than finite aspects of the complexity of social phenomena, are rarities. The point here
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is that Dewey regards this division of responsibilities as necessary to overcoming the
criticisms leveled at large bureaucracies. To the extent that this technical civil service
can operate as experts in inquiry only, and leave the responsibility of making policy in
the hands of the citizenry through elected officials, this bureaucracy will have its
capacity to thwart political change by maintaining the status quo reduced. What
Dewey failed to notice is that there are political processes manifest in the inner
workings of large bureaucracies, that can distort the information a bureaucracy
produces. This will have a substantial effect on the ability of a technical civil service to
serve its intended function, and will consequently require a level of oversight
commensurate with the problem.
These responses to some hypothetical criticisms of Dewey's program lead to
further questions, one of which focuses on the problem of delegated legislative
authority. Politicians are typically generalists who rely on experts to make particular
policy decisions all the time. This is a natural by-product of our massive
representative system. Therefore, relieving the civil service that has grown up around
our large federal government of its policy-making responsibilities is impossible. A
Deweyan response to this position would suggest that the problem of delegated
legislative authority is a symptom of the disease described above as the centralizing
forces in our society. The federal government has taken on too many responsibilities.
This has led to the need to delegate away some of these responsibilities. The
devolution of some powers held by the federal government to other governmental
institutions would allow for a commensurate decrease in the need for delegating away
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responsibilities. Enumerating particular areas of devolution is beyond the scope of this
present work. Furthermore, it is consistent with Dewey's position that such
devolution can only occur as a result of experimentation combined with scientific
inquiry as to its effects on society as a whole.
Contrary to the point recently made by Alan Ryan, it is clear that Dewey was
well aware of the problems that bureaucracies pose in maintaining a constant revision
of political institutions. 58 Dewey acknowledges that "changes are extrinsic to political
forms which, once established, persist of their own momentum."59 Furthermore, he
was aware that bureaucracies are "elaborate and well institutionalized" and act to
,,
"obstruct the organization of the new public. 6o What this problem calls for is 'lhe
creation of adequately flexible and responsive political and legal machinery" in light of
the fact that society is constantly changing.61 Dewey was well aware of the
"denunciations of bureaucracy and the proclamations that individualism is the source
of our national prosperity."62 The way in which Dewey seeks to describe a balance
between central and local government, combined with a civil service, is meant to
counteract those forces Ryan claims Dewey does not address. The loss of
responsiveness and the lack of connectedness between individual and community are
problems Dewey associates with the present political system. These problems, as he
says, are exacerbated by bureaucracies. Dewey's call for a constant revisioning of
political institutions includes bureaucratic institutions as well.63 Dewey may not have
solved the problems bureaucracies pose for democracy, but he certainly was aware of
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them. He thinks that addressing these problems through an experimental procedure is
the way to disclosing how to ameliorate them.
The balance ofpolitical decision-making in the federal system Dewey outlines
can be seen more clearly in his discussion ofthe role ofthe state. It must be first
pointed out that the idea of"an a priori conception ofthe intrinsic nature ofthe
,,
individual on one side and the state on the other yield(ing) good results is absurd. 64
Dewey insists with logical consistency that the role ofthe state is a matter to be
determined through experimentation.65 Given these considerations, Dewey concludes
that he can only define the state in its most fundamental form, as '<the organization of
the public effected through officials for the protection ofthe interests shared by its
,
members.' 66 Nothing enlightening there, one might say. However, the terms used
express a good deal when placed in the context ofDewey's position. The organization
ofthe public referred to concerns bringing the work ofthe civil service to bear upon
the needs oflocal government institutions. The officials referred to are those chosen
by election, not the civil service, who act as "guardians ofcustom, as legislators, as
executives, judges, etc."67 The interests shared refers to, among other things, making
sure that the civil service does not become a menace to democracy. The state is
responsible for infrastructure, as well as for regulating all forms ofcommercial
transaction according to the principles ofeffective and equal bargaining. 68 The
regulatory component ofthe state's responsibilities obviously calls for a large central
government, certainly one that is large enough to reflect the size and complexity of
society as a whole. Wherever there are "widely distributed consequences" ofsocial

84

interaction, there is a "common interest and the need for special agencies to care for
it."69 This is problematic for the goal Dewey has in mind. However, I think a clear
distinction between local and federal responsibilities that favors as much as possible
having the guardianship of rights and resources at the federal level, and policy-making
where appropriate at the local level, is the balance that Dewey had in mind. Dewey
was aware of the problems associated with his attempt to balance policy-making
responsibilities between local and central governmental institutions in a federal system.
He states that "self-government of the town meeting type is adequate for the
management of local affairs, such as school buildings, district revenues, local roads,
and local taxation."70 However, he knew that this form of government is inadequate
for handling political affairs that have an effect on, and our affected by, global issues.
He points out that ''while participation in town meetings is good as far as it arouses
public spirit, it cannot provide the information that enables a citizen to be an intelligent
judge of national affairs - now also affected by world conditions."71 The "void
created" by the cognitive gap between local experience and the need to account for
global issues is a limiting factor on what policy roles local government can take
responsibility for.72 Dewey is well aware of this limiting factor. However, I don't
think his intentions were to figure out a way to overcome this void in theory. Rather, I
think he meant such problems to be handled by those engaged in the political practices
of a given community.
"The deepest problem of modern life," Dewey claims, is "the problem of
restoring integration and cooperation between one's beliefs about the world" as
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determined to a great extent by scientific inquiry, and "his beliefs about the values and
purposes that should direct his conduct."73 This problem, according to Dewey, should
be approached through the wedding of scientific procedure and normative discourse.
It has been pointed out above that the technical civil service, as I describe it, engages
in information gathering and dissemination according to the widely understood
conception of scientific procedure. This does not mean a disclosure of universal
truths, as argued in a previous chapter. It has also been pointed out above that the
civil service's function should not extend to the sphere of policy-making. Their role in
government is as an information resource for policy-makers. The policy-making
process is where normative analysis takes place. This is where the community's values
are "operationally defined" through the use of an "intelligent method" of decision
making to determine which social policies will be the outcome of a community
discourse. 74 The sort of intelligent method referred to is one concerned with decisions
that ''will determine the main course of our conduct, personal and social."75 Intelligent
method, as an ideal type, is a process that resembles the intersubjectively transmissible
requirements of scientific procedure. This scientific attitude in normative discourse
ideally does away with "prejudice, the pressure of immediate circumstance, self
interest and class-interest, traditional customs, (and) institutions of accidental historical
origin" in order to develop a common ground upon which policy decisions can be
rendered. 76 One may balk at the possibility of such a goal ever being realized.
However, the important point here is that to the extent it is realized is the extent that
the answer to the question "What is the public?" is realized. It appears to be the case
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that the public is announced through this particular form of discourse. Further, the
answers to the questions concerning what the individual is, and what his connection to
the community is, can also be found through this discourse.
Another one of the problems referred to earlier can now be briefly addressed
from a Deweyan perspective. This is the concern with the modern liberal democratic
community's ability to deal with the myriad of demands corning from its
heterogeneous citizenry. One of the responses to this problem, mentioned above,
supposes that the way to deal with it is to limit access to the political system. Another
response is a search for community through the most heinous means by retreating into
exclusive, nationalistic communities. Firstly, it is ridiculous to assume that even the
most homogeneous, or least open, political system would have so few different
demands that the admittance of personal or class interests into the political forum
would be avoided. The reversion to exclusive, read here totalitarian, states is clearly
not an acceptable resolution. Rather, the extent to which Dewey's hopes for a public
discourse that is unencumbered by prejudices and interests can be realized is the extent
to which an inclusive nation-state can move forward harmoniously as a community.
This is the more realistic goal that states must move themselves towards, although this
is pessimistically not seen to be the case. The goal of a homogeneous and therefore
harmonious nation-state, or one that can withstand the tensions caused by limited
access to the system, is actually the more idealistic one. The world is growing ever so
much closer due to technological advances.
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The application ofDewey's political theory to contemporary democratic
practices faces significant problems. The role Dewey has designed for his technical
civil service, as an information bureau isolated from policy-making, is the most glaring
problem with his theory. This idea flies in the face ofempirical evidence which shows
a growing trend to greater reliance on the ability ofcivil service institutions to take on
policy-making responsibilities. Those who are in control ofinformation that is
relevant in policy-making have discretionary powers that effect policy. Therefore, civil
service institutions that control information have a role in policy-making by their
nature. Dewey overlooks this aspect ofthe civil service's role in information
management.
Dewey's advocacy ofdirect democracy at the local level faces problems
associated with contemporary culture's inability to develop an enlightened electorate
that is equal to the task ofdeveloping public policy in an increasingly complex world.
Dewey is not at all unaware ofthe problem, as his focus on culture as the source of
innovation or lack thereofattests. This problem with Dewey's theory highlights
problems that contemporary society faces on a fundamental level. The issues of
education and cultural sophistication must be addressed before one can realistically
extol the benefits ofdirect democracy. As these fundamental problems go unresolved,
so do problems associated with Dewey's political theory.
Dewey insightfully points out some ofthe great problems facing liberal
democracies. These insights are as important today as they were in his own time.
Dewey's recognition ofthe tendency ofliberal democracies to lose their capacity for
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innovation and experimentation is an issue that is even more important in our day than
his. Our political institutions do not evolve in consonance with the rapid changes
taking place in our society. Consequently, our political institutions do not respond
effectively to the demands our places upon them. The gap between social change and
between political change is a measure of the level of democracy in society. Jefferson
saw in his day a need for a revolution in political arrangements every twenty years.
Given the rapidity with which society changes today, both Dewey and Jefferson might
advocate innovation in political arrangements at far shorter intervals.
Unlike Jefferson and the Anti-federalists, Dewey retained respect for
government at both the federal and local levels. His theory is important in this regard
for its re-emphasis on finding a proper balance between federal and local government,
as opposed to the short-sighted approach taken by state's rights advocates, and those
who think that ending "big government" programs is the panacea for our nation's ills.
While many contemporary communitarians blame liberalism per se for
observed social decay, Dewey rather plausibly identifies the market system as the
primary cause of this problem. Like his balanced approach to a federal system of
government, Dewey's focus on the problems of distribution of wealth and opportunity
in a market economy emphasizes the need to maintain a balance between an efficient
economy and a stable democratic polity.
Dewey's work enjoys a resurgence of attention today by riding a wave of
enthusiasm for strong participatory democracy. The problems in his theory mirror the
problems our society faces in striving towards greater participation in the political
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process. Inquiring into the problems with Dewey's theory could serve heuristically
towards finding solutions to our political problems. Such inquiries could serve us well
as part of the program Dewey advocates; which is developing innovative social and
political practices that bring about greater democracy and community.
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